Essays on Bayesian persuasion by Khantadze, Davit
 warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/104204 
 
Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Essays On Bayesian Persuasion
Davit Khantadze
A thesis presented for the degree o f Doctor of
Philosophy
Department of Economics
University of Warwik
United Kingdom
September, 2017
Contents
1 Literature review 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Different approaches to bayesian persuasion . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Choosing optimal posterior distributions - Con-
cavification approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.2 Information design approach to bayesian persua-
sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Competition in Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Informed receiver(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Dynamic bayesian persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.1 Ely: Beeps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5.2 Hörner and Skrzypacz: Selling Information . . . . 25
1.6 Further contributions to bayesian persuasion . . . . . . . 28
1.7 Multidimensional persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2 Two-dimensional bayesian persuasion 30
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2 Signal structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.3 Sequential signal structure and order of moves . . 35
2.3.4 Simultaneous signal structure and order of moves 36
2.3.5 Optimal signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 General Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2
2.5 Optimal simultaneous and sequential signal structures,
when n=1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5.1 Optimal simultaneous signal . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5.2 Sequential signal structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6 Characterising conditions for a sequential signal struc-
ture to achieve an upper bound when n=2 . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendix 2.A Optimal signals when n=2 and only one de-
cision is to be made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3 Identifying the reasons for coordination failure in a labora-
tory experiment 57
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1.1 Related works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.4 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4.1 Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.6 The role of beliefs in the fight against female genital mu-
tilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix 3.A Belief hierarchies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix 3.B Equilibrium selection and models of higher-
order beliefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix 3.C Order effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix 3.D Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix 3.E Online Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.E.1 Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.E.2 Quiz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4 Bibliography 98
3
Acknowledgments
I want to thank my advisors Ilan Kremer and Motty Perry for their
guidance. I am especially grateful to Ilan Kremer for encouragement
and insightful discussions.
I also would like to thank Kirill Pogorelskiy who read my paper.
I am grateful to various faculty members at the economics depart-
ment at Warwick for stimulating conversations.
I would like to thank Philipp Külpmann for being an excellent co-
author.
Financial support from the economics department at Warwick and
ESRC studentship made my stay at Warwick possible. I appreciate
this.
I want to dedicate this work to my family.
4
Declaration
I declare that all the following work was carried out by me. Except the
following:
Chapter 3 I co-authored with Philipp Külpmann.
5
Abstract
Chapter 1 reviews the literature about the bayesian persuasion. It first
describes two main approaches to bayesian persuasion: concavifica-
tion approach and information design approach. Next I consider some
extensions to the basic model of bayesian persuasion, like competi-
tion between different senders, privately informed receiver and dy-
namic bayesian persuasion. Some other contributions reviewed in-
clude costly bayesian persuasion and bayesian persuasion when re-
ceiver’s optimal action is only a function of an expected state.
Chapter 2 deals with two-dimensional bayesian persuasion. In this
chapter I investigate a model when the receiver has to make two de-
cisions. I am interested in optimal signal structures for the sender.
I describe the upper bound of sender’s payoff in terms of his pay-
off when only marginal distributions of two dimensions are known.
Completely characterise optimal simultaneous and sequential signal
structures, when each dimension has binary states. This approach ex-
tends concavification approach to bigger state space, than explored in
previous contributions to bayesian persuasion. Finally I characterise
optimal sequential signal structure when there are three states for each
dimension.
In chapter 3 I investigate together with my co-author the effect
of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination
games in a laboratory experiment. In our experiment, around 76% of
the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy de-
spite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players
had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9%
exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs.
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Chapter 1
Literature review
1.1 Introduction
Economists aim to solve optimisation problems; the latter can take dif-
ferent forms. In the current paper we want to discuss a class of pa-
pers that broadly deal with bayesian persuasion, i.e. how one party,
the sender, can provide information optimally to the other party, the
receiver. Optimality means maximising sender’s payoff. The inten-
tion of the literature on bayesian persuasion is to understand situa-
tions, where one party has to make a decision based on the informa-
tion provided by the other party. Examples might be following: seller
can provide some information to the buyer about the product quality;
the prosecutor undertakes investigation about the crime and provides
this information to the judge; politician provides information about
the quality of the project to the public. The question becomes inter-
esting if there is some conflict of interest between the sender and the
receiver. The seller might want to sell the product independent of it’s
quality, whereas the buyer wants to buy the product only if the qual-
ity is good. The prosecutor might want to send the defendant into
the prison independent if the latter is guilty or not, whereas the judge
wants to declare guilty only if the defendant is indeed guilty.
This review intends to discuss some main contributions in the field
and can not claim to give the complete review of the bayesian persua-
sion literature. First, in section 1.2 we discuss two different approaches
7
to bayesian persuasion; first approach, made popular by Kamenica
and Gentzkow [2011], uses the concavification argument, as devel-
oped by Aumann and Maschler [1995]; second approach uses the con-
cept of bayesian equilibrium and extends it to the case where the me-
diator has informational advantage relative to the players of the game.
This approach was pioneered in a series of papers by Bergemann and
Morris [2016a,b]. Next, in section 1.3 we discuss the case when multi-
ple senders try to persuade a single receiver. Section 1.4 reviews liter-
ature about informed receiver, i.e. when receiver has some additional
information. In section 1.5 we review two papers that deal with dy-
namic setting. Last section briefly reviews some other approaches to
bayesian persuasion.
1.2 Different approaches to bayesian persua-
sion
In this section we discuss how economists think about acquiring infor-
mation by sender, when he does not have commitment problems. First
we explore the concavification approach.
1.2.1 Choosing optimal posterior distributions - Con-
cavification approach
Let’s consider following problem: receiver has to make a decision -
a. Sender has preferences over receiver’s actions. Receiver’s optimal
action is a function of his beliefs - â(µ). For example judge’s decision is
a function of his belief about defendant being guilty or innocent. Say
sender can choose, given some common prior µ0, receiver’s posteriors.
What is the optimal way for him to do this? This question is dealt by
Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] and we intend to reproduce here some
of their main arguments.
Receiver’s utility is a function of his action and of the state of the
world - u(a,ω), where a ∈ A is receiver’s action and ω ∈ Ω state of
8
the world. The knowledge about state of the world is given by com-
mon prior distribution µ0 ∈ 4(Ω). Sender can influence receiver’s
beliefs by choosing a signal. Signal is a mapping pi : Ω → 4(S).
It means that sender can choose conditional distributions given state,
pi(.|ω). Probability distribution is over some signal realisation space S
and si is some element in S. While it might not be immediate how to
address the problem of choosing optimal information structure, con-
cavification argument says that there exists a simple solution to this
problem if one is able to draw the graph of sender’s value function as
a function of receiver’s beliefs. Before further exploring this question
let’s consider following example, that was formulated by Bergemann
and Morris [2016a] and is equivalent to the example by Kamenica and
Gentzkow [2011].
A depositor has to decide to stay with the bank (s) or not (r). State
of the world is good (G) or bad (B) and bank is solvent if ω = G and
insolvent if ω = B. Depositor and regulator have common prior and
assign equal probability to both states. Depositor’s utility function is
the following:
u(s, G) = y u(s, B) = −1
u(r, G) = 0 u(r, B) = 0
(1.1)
We assume that y ∈ (0, 1) in general. For this example y = 0.5.
Regulator prefers depositor to stay with the bank, independent of
the state of the world. Regulator’s utility if depositor chooses (s) is 1
and 0 if depositor chooses (r). While it might not be immediate what
is the optimal signal for the regulator, analysing regulator’s problem
geometrically, makes solution straightforward.
Before doing this, first we want to summarise the concavification
approach, as formulated by Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011].
Let’s state one observation, that will turn out helpful in our search
for optimal signal structure.
From the law of total probability it follows that for arbitrary signal,
following must be true:
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µ(ω) = µ(ω|s1)p(s1) + ...+ µ(ω|sn)p(sn) (1.2)
Equation 1.2 says that for any signal expected posterior must equal
to prior. In turns out that this is the only constraint that a distribution
of posterior beliefs has to satisfy.
Following observation is important for the concavification approach:
instead of thinking about a particular signal, one can think about the
distribution of posterior beliefs, that satisfy equation 1.2. We repro-
duce Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]’s result here.
Proposition 1. Following statements are equivalent:
i There exists a signal that gives sender some expected payoff v∗;
ii There exists a distribution of posteriors, whose expectation equals to
prior and sender’s expected payoff equals v∗.
Let’s denote sender’s value function by υ(µ) and it’s convex hull
by co(υ). Now we want to introduce the concept of concavification of
the function. Given prior µ, sender’s maximum feasible payoff can be
described in the following way:
V(µ) ≡ sup {x2|(µ, x2) ∈ co(ν)} (1.3)
V(µ) is the smallest concave function everywhere weakly greater
than υ(µ) and Aumann and Maschler [1995] refer to V(µ) as the con-
cavification of υ(µ).
Now we can summarise concavification approach to finding sender’s
optimal signal structure:
1 : Draw sender’s value function as a function of posterior beliefs -
υ(µ)
2 : Draw the concave closure of υ−V(µ)
3 : Find distribution of posteriors µs − (τ), s.t. Eτυ = V(µ)
4 : Given (τ), calculate signal structure that induces (τ).
10
Figure 1.1: Concavification of a function - an example; copied from
Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]
Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] show that step 4 is always possi-
ble.
We will use this approach to find regulator’s optimal signal.
First we want to construct regulator’s value function as a func-
tion of depositor’s beliefs. If µ(ω = G) < 23 then aˆ(µ) = r and if
µ(ω = G) ≥ 23 , then aˆ(µ) = s. Thus regulator’s value function, with-
out signals, is the following:
0 if µ(ω = G) <
2
3
(1.4)
1 if µ(ω = G) ≥ 2
3
(1.5)
Now, by using equation 1.2 we are able to describe all possible ex-
pected payoffs regulator can achieve by choosing some signal struc-
ture. Regulator’s feasible expected payoffs can be described in the fol-
lowing way: x = (0.5, x2) ∈ co(υ). This is the vertical line in figure
11
Figure 1.2: Concavification of regulator’s value function
1.2.
Concavification of regulator’s value function is the following:
V(µ) = min{3
2
µ, 1} (1.6)
Optimisation implies that regulator would choose highest avail-
able expected payoff. One can see that this payoff is given by the fol-
lowing formula: λ 23 + (1− λ)0 = 12 , where λ is the probability that
posterior equals 23 . So, regulator can choose a signal structure that in-
duces following distribution of posterior beliefs:
µ =
2
3
with probability
3
4
(1.7)
µ = 0 with probability
1
4
(1.8)
What is the signal structure that gives this distribution of poste-
riors? Note that bayes rule, together with equation 1.7 implies that
pi(ss|ω = G) = 1. Therefore following signal structure induces de-
sired distribution of posteriors:
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pi(ss|ω = G) = 1 pi(ss|ω = G) = 12
p(sr|ω = G) = 0 pi(sr|ω = B) = 12
(1.9)
Now we have accomplished the following: we described a rela-
tively simple procedure how to find a joint distribution of signal reali-
sations and states that is most favourable for the regulator.
ω = G ω = B
sr 0.50 0.25
ss 0.00 0.25
The goal of the exercise was to show that when one can graph the
value function of the sender as a function of beliefs, then one can find
optimal signal structure by first finding optimal distribution of poste-
rior beliefs.
Now we describe information design approach to bayesian persua-
sion, as suggested by Bergemann and Morris [2016a,b].
1.2.2 Information design approach to bayesian persua-
sion
Bergemann and Morris [2016a,b] develop an information design ap-
proach, that uses the concept of mediator, which gives recommen-
dations possibly to multiple receivers. They show that if there is a
single receiver, then their approach to information design reduces to
"bayesian persuasion". As we will see, the information design ap-
proach makes it relatively easy to model the private information of the
receiver, i.e. when the receiver also observes additional, possibly pub-
lic, informative signal about the state of the world. Before discussing
the case of the receiver with additional information, we will discuss
the above example by using the concepts as suggested by Bergemann
and Morris [2016a,b].
We want to think about the problem as discussed in subsection
(1.2.1) in the following way: regulator makes action recommendations
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given state; therefore we say that mediator has an information advan-
tage. Let’s denote by ρθ regulator’s recommendation for the depositor
to run, when the state is θ ∈ {B, G}. Now, regulator’s recommenda-
tion has to satisfy obedience constraint, i.e. it has to be optimal for the
depositor to follow the recommendation. Therefore, the depositor will
have an incentive to stay, if
(1/2)(1− ρG)(1/2)− (1/2)(1− ρB) ≥ 0, (1.10)
and an incentive to run if
0 ≥ (1/2)ρG(1/2) + (1/2)ρB(−1). (1.11)
We note that obedience constraint for staying 1.10 implies obedi-
ence constraint for run 1.11.
Therefore, we can write 1.10 in the following form:
ρB ≥ 1− 12 +
1
2
ρG (1.12)
Say regulator’s goal is to minimise the probability of depositor run-
ning, then we see from inequality 1.12 that ρG = 0 and ρB = 12 . Note
that this recommendation rule will make the depositor stay with prob-
ability 34 . Note also that recommendation rule and signal structure as
given in the expression 1.9 coincide.
After having described general approaches to bayesian persuasion,
now we will discuss contributions that extend bayesian persuasion as
described above in several dimensions. First we will discuss the case
of several senders, i.e. when there is a competition between senders.
1.3 Competition in Persuasion
Our discussion of competition in persuasion is based on the following
contributions by Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a, 2017a].
The main quesiton of Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a] is the fol-
lowing: what is the property of information structures that guarantees
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that competition among senders will increase the amount of informa-
tion revealed. To begin with, Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a] con-
struct an example where competition among firms reduces the amount
of information revealed. It turns out that there is a simple characteri-
sation of information structures that guarantees that competition does
not decrease the amount of information. Competition can not decrease
the amount of information revealed if and only if following is true:
every player can induce any feasible distribution of posteriors that is
more informative than posteriors induced by all other senders. One
distribution of beliefs is more informative than other, if it is a mean
preserving spread of the other. Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a] call
this condition Blackwell-connected. So, if information structure is not
Blackwell-connected one can construct an example when competition
can decrease the amount of information revealed.
One also would like to know what is the equilibrium outcome when
there is competition among senders. To be able to describe equilibrium
outcomes one has to assume that all senders have access to the same
set of signals. Call a distribution of beliefs unimprovable for sender i,
if for any other feasible distribution of beliefs sender i would not be
better off. Then, Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a] are able to prove
following result:
Proposition 2. Say information environment is Blackwell-connected and
each sender has access to the same set of signals. Then a feasible outcome
is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is unimprovable for each sender.
One can see that if an outcome is not unimprovable, then Blackwell-
connected means that there exists a sender i that can increase his pay-
off by inducing a more informative distribution of beliefs, that will in-
crease his payoff. From this characterisation of the set of equilibrium
outcomes it follows that one can easily find this set: one has to find the
intersection of unimprovable outcomes. Unimprovable outcome can
be described in the following way: the support of the distribution of
posteriors µ is such that v(µ) = V(µ), where v(µ) is sender’s expected
utility without signal and V(µ) is concavification of sender’s value
function. Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] show that for one sender,
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optimality implies this condition. But with many senders, Gentzkow
and Kamenica [2016a, 2017a] show that this condition should be satis-
fied for all senders.
We will illustrate this by the following example: Graph (a) depicts
value function of sender 1 and graph (b) of sender 2. Solid line inter-
vals indicate unimprovable beliefs for each sender. The set of equilib-
rium outcomes is the intersection of these sets and in this example is
the following: [τ1, τ2] ∪ {1}.
Horizontal axis in the graph depicts the share of facts revealed, so
1 means that all facts are revealed; therefore moving to the right of the
horizontal axis means revealing more information.
Graph (d) depicts the collusive outcome, i.e. revealed facts that
maximise senders 1 and 2 overall payoffs. As one can see all equilib-
rium outcomes reveal more facts than collusive outcome. This is in ac-
cordance with the claim that if information environment is Blackwell-
connected then collusive outcome can not reveal more information.
One can also see that fully informative outcome is an equilibrium.
This follows from proposition 2. So, if all senders choose from the
same set of signals and information environment is Blackwell-connected,
then most informative feasible outcome is always an equilibrium.
We could apply these ideas to our example about regulator and
depositor. Say there also exists another, competing bank that prefers
depositor to run than to stay. So it gets payoff 1 if the depositor runs
and 0 if it stays. Let’s call it competitor. It can also produce signals
for the depositor. Assume that depositor stays if his posterior of bank
being good is at least 23 . Then concavification of competitor’s value
function is given in figure 1.4.
So, when regulator chooses his optimal signal, then competitor
could reveal information about the bank and increase it’s payoff. The
only equilibrium outcome of this game is fully informative signals.
Note that when fully informative signals are produced, then for any
posterior belief µ, following is true for both regulator and competitor:
vi(µ) = Vi(µ), i ∈ {regulator, competitor}, i.e. beliefs are unimprov-
able for both senders.
16
Figure 1.3: Characterising equilibrium outcome. (a) Sender 1’s pref-
erences. (b) Sender 2’s preferences. (c) Equilibrium construction. (d)
Collusive preferences - copied from Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016a]
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Figure 1.4
This example shows that sender can be worse off from competition,
because receiver gets more information. Here receiver’s additional in-
formation is an outcome of strategic interaction between competing
senders. Next we want to review literature that explores following
question: receiver gets informative public signal about the state of the
world.
1.4 Informed receiver(s)
Bergemann and Morris [2016a] divide information design in two steps:
first, describe the set of feasible outcomes in general and second de-
scribe what outcomes will be chosen from an interested party and
what is the information structure that leads to these outcomes.
These approach was already used in section (1.2.2)while discussing
information design approach to bayesian persuasion. Now we will il-
lustrate it for the case when the depositor observes informative public
signal about the state of the world.
Public signal is drawn from the following joint distribution of the
signal space and the decision relevant state space:
18
ω = G ω = B
g q2
1−q
2
b 1−q2
q
2
q > 12 .
The set of feasible outcomes will also be determined by the follow-
ing: the regulator observes depositor’s public signal or not. First let’s
consider the case when the public signal, i.e. depositor’s additional
information, is observed by the regulator. Therefore, regulator’s rec-
ommendation will be a function of the state and the signal observed.
Now for a recommendation to stay to satisfy obedience constraint,
i.e. for depositor to have an incentive to follow the recommendation, it
should take into account depositor’s conditional belief about the state
of the world that he forms after observing the public signal. So, when
the depositor observes good signal, then he will follow the recommen-
dation to stay, if
q(1− ρGg)(1/2)− (1− q)(1− ρBg) ≥ 0 (1.13)
Similarly, depositor will follow the recommendation to run after he
observed the good signal, if:
0 ≥ qρGg(1/2) + (1− q)ρBg(−1). (1.14)
Similar conditions have to be satisfied if the public signal is bad. In
expectation, for a recommendation to be followed, following condition
should be satisfied, that we give in a form of proposition:
Proposition 3. The probabilities ρB, ρG form an equilibrium outcome for
some information structure if
ρB ≥ max
{
q(1+
1
2
), 1
}− 1
2
+
1
2
ρG. (1.15)
This describes the set of all possible recommendation rules that sat-
isfy obedience constraint. As the precision of the public signal (q) in-
creases, ρG becomes 0 and ρB becomes 1, so the only feasible recom-
mendation is the fully informative one. Since depositor becomes fully
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informed about the state of the world from observing the public sig-
nal, there is not much the regulator can do by providing additional
information.
Bergemann and Morris [2016a] show that the set of feasible out-
comes shrinks when the depositor gets additional information and this
information is also observed by the regulator. This set shrinks even
more if depositor’s additional information is not observed by the reg-
ulator and he has to elicit if from the depositor.
Bergemann and Morris [2016b] extend the result that receiver’s ad-
ditional information reduces the set of feasible outcomes to many play-
ers case. They identify the condition of "more informative" in the sense
of Blackwell in the case of many players, for which the result extends
to the many player setting.
Kolotilin et al. [forthcoming] consider following question: receiver
has private information about his preferences; sender can commit to
information disclosure about the state. Sender’s and receiver’s utili-
ties are linear function of the state and receiver’s type. Sender, before
choosing a signal structure could ask the receiver his type and the sig-
nal could be a function of the receiver’s report. Or sender could choose
a signal structure independent of receiver’s report. Kolotilin et al.
[forthcoming] show that in their setting there is no loss of generality in
considering only signal structures. Therefore sender can ignore more
complex persuasion mechanisms and produce signal without asking
the receiver to report his type.
Now we will discuss some papers that deal with bayesian persua-
sion in the dynamic context.
1.5 Dynamic bayesian persuasion
1.5.1 Ely: Beeps
Ely [2017] considers dynamic setting of information provision. State of
the world evolves and agent’s belief changes over time even if the prin-
cipal does not provide any information. Information provided by the
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principal changes agent’s current belief and also shapes the path of it’s
further evolution. Ely [2017] extends the approach to information pro-
vision as formulated by Aumann and Maschler [1995] and Kamenica
and Gentzkow [2011] to the dynamic setting. In particular he extends
the insight that it is without loss of generality to analyse distribution of
posterior beliefs, s.t. expectation equals prior, to the dynamic setting
and one can use geometric approach to find optimum distribution of
posteriors and optimal signal that induces it.
Ely [2017] considers following motivating example. An agent has
to work, but is distracted by checking emails. The IT-department (prin-
cipal) considers how to filter information so that the agent checks the
email as late as possible. Principal could use the email notification soft-
ware that beeps when the email arrives. If the software is switched on,
then the worker stops working when he hears the beep. E-mail arrival
is modelled as a poisson process. The e-mail arrival rate is λ. So, if the
software is switched on, then expected arrival time of the e-mail is 1λ .
Principal could decide to switch-off the software. Assume that the
agent has a threshold belief p∗, s.t. when his belief is at least as big
as p∗, then he checks the e-mail. When the beep is turned off, then
agent’s belief that an email has arrived is 1− e−λt and therefore agent’s
working time is the following:
t∗ = − log(1− p
∗)
λ
(1.16)
By comparing equation (1.16) with 1λ one can see that for high p
∗
agent will work longer if beep is turned off. If p∗ is low enough then
agent works longer when beep is turned on.
These two regimes are two extremes of information disclosure: when
beep is turned on, then principal chooses full information disclosure,
since the signal perfectly informs about the state of the world, whereas
if beep is turned off, then no information is disclosed. Can the princi-
pal do better? Does there exist a way to make the agent work longer
than any of these two mechanisms? Ely [2017] suggests following
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mechanism, that turns out to be also optimal: beep with a delay. If
e-mail arrives at date t, the agent hears beep at date t + t∗. Expected
time of work, as induced by this mechanism, is t∗ + 1λ .
Note that the suggested mechanism accomplishes the following:
when principal’s and agent’s interests are aligned, i.e. t ≤ t∗, principal
does nothing. When t > t∗, i.e. agent’s belief, without information, is
such that he would check the e-mail, then principal filters information
such that agent’s belief is either p∗ or 1. Note the resemblance to the
depositor case, where the depositor learns the true state only if the
state is bad. Similarly in the current example the agent learns that
email has arrived only if t > t∗, i.e. he would check the e-mail if there
was no additional information provided by the principal.
How does the suggested mechanism accomplish this? Because the
agent hears the beep with delay t∗, it means that he does not hear beep
for the period of t∗. Say t > t∗ and the agent has not heard the beep.
Then the agent knows that e-mail has not arrived t∗ periods before and
his belief is p∗.
Before giving the proof that this is principal’s optimal mechanism,
we briefly describe how to extend the insight from the static bayesian
persuasion that it is without loss of generality to consider distribu-
tion of posterior beliefs, whose expectation equals prior. In the dy-
namic context Ely [2017] shows that it is without loss of generality to
directly choose a stochastic process for the agent’s beliefs, given that
this process satisfies two properties: expected posterior equals prior
and agent’s belief evolves according to the state transition probability.
Ely [2017] first guesses principal’s optimal strategy, which is de-
layed beep. The value function for this strategy, for agent’s current
belief µt being smaller than the critical value, i.e. µ ≤ p∗, is given by
the following equation:
V(µ) =
1
r
[
(1− e−rτ(µ)) + e−rτ(µ)( r
r + λ
)]
(1.17)
For µ ∈ (p∗, 1] guess is made that value function is linear. There-
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Figure 1.5: Value function for the t∗−delayed beep - copied from Ely
[2017]
fore, the guessed value function is given by figure 1.5
Proving optimality consists in showing that the suggested strategy
is unimprovable. By taking into account that feasible policies induce
distribution of posterior beliefs whose expectation equals prior belief,
one has to consider deviations that satisfy this condition. But then,
given this constraint, one can describe the optimal value as a concavi-
fication of the value function. Ely [2017] verifies that principal’s opti-
mal payoff from one-shot deviation coincides with the suggested value
function arising from the strategy of delayed beep.
Optimal payoff can be formulated in the following form:
rV = cav
[
u +V′ · dv
dv
]
(1.18)
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Figure 1.6: Concavification - copied from Ely [2017]
where, cav denotes concavification of the expression in the bracket.
Graph of the expression in the bracket of equation (1.18) is the follow-
ing:
Concavification argument also explains why delayed beep is an op-
timal strategy. The value function without signal is concave for µ ≤ p∗,
therefore it is optimal for the principal to not reveal any information
and this is accomplished when beep is delayed by t∗. When agent’s
belief becomes bigger than p∗, then concavification is strictly higher
than the value function without signal. In this case the induced poste-
rior beliefs are either p∗ or 1 and this is accomplished by the suggested
strategy.
Next we consider a paper by Hörner and Skrzypacz [2016] that
deals with the following question: how should the agent split infor-
mation optimally to overcome a hold-up problem.
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1.5.2 Hörner and Skrzypacz: Selling Information
Hörner and Skrzypacz [2016] analyse following situation: firm (it) con-
siders to hire an agent (she) to implement a project. Agent can be of
good (1) or bad (0) type. It pays off for the firm to implement the
project only if the agent is of good type. Agent knows her type. Be-
fore the firm makes hiring decision, agent and firm can communicate
in several stages; during each communication stage transfers can be
made and agent can reveal information about her type by choosing
a test. Hörner and Skrzypacz [2016] are interested in the following
question: how can a competent agent persuade the firm to hire her
and still be rewarded for the competence? Motivation for this ques-
tion is to understand incentives of the agent for acquiring the compe-
tence. Formally, authors are interested in finding best possible equilib-
rium outcome for the competent agent. They show that agent increases
her payoff by revealing information gradually. Before reproducing the
argument for gradualism, we briefly describe the set-up, that should
help the exposition.
The firm decides to hire the agent and implement the project, only
if his belief that agent is competent is above some threshold, denoted
by p∗. Firm’s belief determines his outside option, that we denote by
w(p). If p > p∗, then firm’s outside option is positive, otherwise it is
0. We assume that p0 < p∗, i.e. firm’s prior belief is smaller than the
threshold. Firm’s payoff from hiring a competent agent is 1; therefore
from firm’s perspective, when he beliefs that agent is competent with
probability p, expected overall surplus is p.
Prior of hiring decision agent and firm communicate for K stages.
The agent can choose the difficulty of the test in each communica-
tion stage. Denote test’s difficulty by m ∈ [0, 1]. m is the probability
with which the test is passed by the incompetent agent. Competent
agent passes the test with probability 1.
The choice of test-technology leads to a distribution of posteriors
that equals to prior. So, if m is such that in case the test is passed,
posterior becomes p′, then one knows also distribution of posteriors,
because expectation of this distribution should be prior.
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Firm’s expected gain, when the agent chooses test-technology, is
given by the following equation:
EF[w(p′)]− w(p) (1.19)
where EF[ ] is firm’s expectation operator.
Hörner and Skrzypacz [2016] consider an equilibrium, where in
each communication stage the firm pays it’s entire expected gain from
the additional information to the agent.
Now we are ready to show why gradual information provision
benefits the agent. Say there is 1 round of communication.
By the argument as formulated in proposition (1), Hörner and Skrzy-
pacz [2016] look at the distribution of posterior beliefs. Say agent
chooses some test that, if it is passed, leads to a posterior belief p1 ≥ p0.
From the law of total probability then follows that posterior becomes
p1 with probability
p0
p1
. By using this information, equation (1.19) be-
comes
p0
p1
w(p1)− w(p0) (1.20)
Because we are considering the case when p0 < p∗, therefore w(p0) =
0, i.e. firm does not implement the project. One can show that w(p1)p1 is
increasing in p1, therefore one can see that with one stage communica-
tion maximum the competent agent can achieve is to choose a perfectly
informative test, so that p1 = 1. The firm would be willing to pay p0
for such a test, i.e. with one stage communication competent agent can
get ex-ante expected surplus.
But the agent can increase her payoff by offering two tests. First
test is chosen such that p1 = p∗. Remember that w(p∗) = 0. Therefore
the firm’s willingness to pay for this test is 0. Given new posterior p∗,
then by repeating the argument of one stage communication, second
test is fully informative and agent’s payoff is p∗.
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Figure 1.7: Revealing information in two steps - copied from Hörner
and Skrzypacz [2016]
Figure 1.7 visualises this argument. Diagonal denotes expected
surplus. w(p)′s curve is below diagonal line and equals 0 for p < p∗.
Can the agent do better than this by offering more tests? Following
example shows that the answer to this question is positive.
Consider now the case when the competent agent offers three tests
that lead to the following posteriors: p∗, p′ and 1.
Figure 1.8 illustrates agent’s payoff from offering three tests. Agent’s
overall payoff one gets by summing two red vertical lines. One can see
that by offering three tests agent can get higher payoff than by offer-
ing only two tests. Agent’s payoff when only two tests are offered is
given by summing the left red line segment and the dashed line seg-
ment above it. But as one sees the right red line segment is bigger than
the dashed line segment.
Hörner and Skrzypacz [2016] show that when p0 < p∗, then agent’s
payoff is maximised by first giving information for free and making
posterior equal to p∗ and then dividing the interval [p∗, 1] into smaller
and smaller intervals.
27
Figure 1.8: Revealing information in three steps - copied from Hörner
and Skrzypacz [2016]
Now we briefly survey some other contributions to bayesian per-
suasion.
1.6 Further contributions to bayesian persua-
sion
Concavification approach requires that sender’s value function can be
expressed as a function of receiver’s beliefs. Gentzkow and Kamenica
[2014] consider the case when producing signal is costly. They charac-
terise the class of cost functions which is compatible with concavifica-
tion approach. Thus, Gentzkow and Kamenica [2014] extend concavi-
fication approach to the case when signals are costly.
Gentzkow and Kamenica [2017b] analyse bayesian persuasion (with
possibly) many senders, where all senders first privately observe sig-
nal realisation. Authors show that endogenous information will be
always disclosed and therefore disclosure requirements do not affect
equilibrium outcome.
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Gentzkow and Kamenica [2016b] considers the setting where re-
ceiver’s optimal action is a function of expected state and sender’s
payoff depends only on receiver’s action. Authors characterise the set
of distribution of posterior means that can be achieved by some signal.
1.7 Multidimensional persuasion
Tamura [2014] considers multidimensional persuasion. It applies semidef-
inite programming approach to characterise an upper bound for sender’s
payoff and derives optimal signal when state is normally distributed.
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Chapter 2
Two-dimensional bayesian
persuasion
2.1 Introduction
A software company (sender) wants to sell two products (A and B) to
the customer (receiver). Sender has to decide how to provide infor-
mation to maximise the likelihood of receiver buying two products.
Sender can choose precision of the information about the products.
What is the optimal way to accomplish this when the information
about one product also contains indirectly information about the other
product?
For illustration, we consider the following example: each product
can be good (1) or bad (0). Receiver gets utility 1 if he buys the good
product or does not buy the bad product and 0 otherwise. Receiver’s
utility is additively separably in two products. So, if receiver buys
both products and each is good, then his utility is 2. Sender’s utility is
also additively separable in two products and his utility is 1 if receiver
buys a product and 0 otherwise. Sender and receiver share common
prior belief about the quality of two products, that is given in figure
2.1.
Sender can design tests that reveal information about the quality
of the product. For example sender could allow receiver to test the
product and thus learn it’s quality. Tests are costless and can be of any
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B = 1 B = 0
A = 1 0.30 0.15
A = 0 0.05 0.50
Figure 2.1: Motivating Example
precision, i.e. test could inform perfectly about the product(s) or not
inform at all.
If A and B were independent, then solution to the problem is well
known. One has two separate persuasion problems and optimal sig-
nal for each product can easily be found by using concavification ar-
gument as developed by Aumann and Maschler [1995] and further
explored by Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]. It is well known that
concavification approach makes it easy to find optimal signal when
the state space is relatively small and it is not straightforward how to
use this approach when state space becomes large. This is so, because
it relies on geometric argument and requires visualisation to find an
optimal signal. This is pointed out for example by Gentzkow and Ka-
menica [2016b], when they mention the following: "... the value func-
tion and it’s concavification can be visualised easily only when there
are two or three states of the world." Therefore, for a state space bigger
than this, it is not immediate how to use concavification of the value
function in order to find optimal signal. Thus note that for a simplest
possible, non-trivial two-dimensional bayesian persuasion problem it
is not immediate how to use concavification approach to find an opti-
mal signal of the sender.
If the sender decides to split the persuasion problem into two parts
and first inform about one product and then about the other, he also
has to take into consideration the fact that the signal about one product
also informs about the other product.
In the current example if the sender decides to inform first only
about product B and then, given new posterior, inform about product
A, one can show that sender’s payoff would be smaller than if only
marginal distributions of A and B were known. But if he chooses to
inform first about A and then about B then there exists a signal which
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gives sender the same payoff as what he would get if only marginal
distributions were known. But can the sender do better than this?
And does there always exist a signal that informs separately about
two products that achieves for the sender the same payoff as when
only marginal distributions are known?
We show for the preference specification of our model that the ad-
ditional information in the form of joint distribution acts as an addi-
tional constraint for the sender and for arbitrary number of states for
each dimension, sender can never achieve a higher payoff than what
he would get if only marginal distributions were known.
From this follows for the current example that there exists a simple
procedure for the sender to maximise his payoff: first inform about
product A and then inform about product B.
Why does the signal that first informs about B and then about A
fail to achieve the upper bound? Because it reveals too much infor-
mation about product A. We describe for arbitrary number of states
and for the given preferences of the current model, the necessary and
sufficient condition for signals that inform about products separately
to achieve the upper bound. This condition states that the support of
the distribution of posteriors of one product, as induced by the sig-
nal of the other product, should belong to the interval, on which the
concavification of sender’s value function for this product is linear.
Next we show that when there are two states for each dimension
and if A and B are positively correlated then there always exists a
signal that informs about products separately and achieves the upper
bound of the payoff for the sender.
We also show by giving an example that there exist joint distribu-
tions, for which there does not exist a signal that informs about two
products separately and achieves the upper bound.
The problem of informing about products separately is that the sig-
nal about one product might reveal too much information about the
other product. Sender can solve this problem by constructing a more
complicated signal that informs about both products simultaneously.
When there are two states for each dimension, we construct the
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simultaneous signal that informs about both products simultaneously
and achieves the upper bound for arbitrary joint distribution.
Next we analyse the case when there are three states for each di-
mension. Finding a signal that informs about both dimensions simul-
taneously now means to find a joint distribution of signal space and
decision relevant space that has up to 81 states. Currently we do not
have solution for this problem. We describe a procedure of how to
split this problem into two parts and inform about products separately.
In particular we clarify when does this procedure achieve the upper
bound for the sender.
The paper is organised in the following way: in the next section
we briefly review the literature about bayesian persuasion. Then we
describe our model. In section 2.4 we derive some general results. Sec-
tion 2.5 analyses the case when there are two states for each dimension.
Then we analyse optimal sequential signals when there are 3 states for
each dimension.
2.2 Related work
Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] analyse optimal information provi-
sion when the single receiver has to make a single decision. They give
a characterisation of optimal signals in a general framework, by using
the concavification argument as formulated by Aumann and Maschler
[1995]. This approach can be summarised in the following way: choos-
ing a signal that maximises sender’s payoff is equivalent to choosing
optimal distribution of posteriors that equals prior in expectation. This
distribution of posteriors can be found by drawing value function of
the sender as a function of beliefs. After one has found optimal distri-
bution of posteriors, one can also find signal that gives this posterior
distribution, by using Bayes rule.
Somewhat related to the current project is the work of Bergemann
and Morris [2016a,b], who develop a general approach of information
design with multiple receivers, where the latter can also get private
signals. Receiver’s private, exogenous signal constrains senders at-
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tainable outcomes. In the current setting, when the sender chooses to
produce information sequentially, receiver’s additional information is
controlled by the sender and is endogenous in this sense, but still can
constrain sender’s achievable outcomes.
2.3 The model
2.3.1 Payoffs
The receiver faces two decision problem, A and B, which sometimes
we will refer to as dimensions 1 and 2. For each dimension the receiver
wants to match the states of the world, which are non negative inte-
gers. Receiver’s utility function is −(aA − ωA)2 − (aB − ωB)2, where
ai, ωi ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, i ∈ {A, B} and some given n. ai denotes receiver’s
action and ωi denotes the state of the world for dimension i. We will
denote joint state by ωA,B = (ωA,ωB), where ωA,B ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}2.
Sender’s utility function is aA + aB. So, the receiver wants to match
the state for each dimension, whereas the sender prefers the receiver
choosing as high a number as possible for each dimension.
2.3.2 Signal structures
Receiver and sender have common prior joint distribution of A and B.
Sender can choose a signal structure, which means, choosing a fam-
ily of conditional distributions. The choice of the signal structure is
common knowledge.
The sender could decide to inform about A and B separately, which
means first producing signal say for A and then for B. We call this a
sequential signal structure. Or the sender could decide to produce
signal for both dimensions simultaneously, i.e. choose a simultaneous
signal structure.
If the sender decides to inform about A and B separately, then we
assume that he can choose the order of persuasion, i.e. sender can
choose the dimension about which to produce the first signal.
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2.3.3 Sequential signal structure and order of moves
A sequential signal structure informs immediately only about one di-
mension. For simplicity here we assume that the first signal is pro-
duced for A and the second signal for B. Signal can be viewed as a
probability distribution over recommendations, which in equilibrium
will be followed by the receiver.
Here we describe a sequential signal structure when the first sig-
nal is produced for A. Sender chooses a family of conditional dis-
tribution functions pi(.|ωAi), over recommendations sAi ∈ S, where
i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}. S denotes the space of signal realisations. The choice
of signal for A is common knowledge. Receiver observes signal real-
isation sAi and updates his beliefs about A by bayes rule. sAi can be
interpreted as a recommendation for the receiver to choose i for A. In
equilibrium this recommendation will be followed.
After observing signal for A, receiver updates his beliefs about A
and takes an action for A that is optimal given his beliefs about A.
Because the common prior is joint distribution of A and B, if A and
B are not independent and if the signal is not uninformative, then the
signal for A will also contain some information about B. Thus, after
updating beliefs about A, receiver’s beliefs about B might also change.
Given these new beliefs about B the sender chooses a signal for B,
which is again a family of conditional distributions over recommen-
dations for B. Receiver observes the choice of the signal for B and the
signal realisation. Then updates his beliefs about B and takes an opti-
mal action for B.
When discussing sequential signal structures, we will refer to the
signal, say of A, as optimal, if for the sender this would be an optimal
signal for A if only marginal distributions of A and B were known.
Next we describe the simultaneous signal structure, i.e. when the
sender decides to inform the receiver about both dimensions simulta-
neously.
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2.3.4 Simultaneous signal structure and order of moves
Sender can decide to provide information simultaneously about both
dimensions. This can be accomplished by making signal a family of
conditional distributions on the joint state space and thus informing
about both dimensions simultaneously. Now an element (s) of the
space of signal realisation (S) can be regarded as a recommendation
about two actions. Simultaneous signal is pi(.|ωA,B), ωA,B ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}×
{0, 1, ..., n}. Signal realisation is s(i,j), where, i and j ∈ {, 0, .., n}, which
can be interpreted in the following way: choose i for dimension A and
j for dimension B.
Simultaneous signal accomplishes the following: given signal re-
alisation s(.,.), receiver forms beliefs about the joint distribution of A
and B. Then, given new joint distribution, receiver calculates marginal
distributions of A and B and makes decisions for both dimensions.
2.3.5 Optimal signals
We are interested in signals that maximise sender’s expected payoff.
Following Bergemann and Morris [2016a] sometimes we will refer to
obedience constraint that signal should satisfy. This means for exam-
ple that if signal realisation is s(i,j), it can be interpreted as a direct
recommendation to the receiver to choose i for dimension A and j for
dimension B and the receiver should have an incentive to follow this
recommendation, i.e. it should be optimal for the receiver to choose
i and j. Also sometimes, for easy of exposition, we will present the
signal as a joint distribution of signal space and the decision relevant
space.
2.4 General Observations
In the current section we want to relate two-dimensional bayesian per-
suasion of the current model to the one-dimensional bayesian prob-
lem. The latter is equivalent to the case when only marginal distribu-
tions of A and B are known, or when A and B are independent. First
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we want to describe receiver’s optimal payoff in terms of his payoff
when only marginal distributions of A and B are known.
Preference specification of our model means that receiver’s opti-
mal decision about dimension i is only a function of expected state for
i. This follows from the fact that receiver’s preferences are additively
separable across dimensions A and B. This means that additional in-
formation in the form of joint distribution of A and B acts like an ad-
ditional constraint for the sender. We formalise this observation in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. For arbitrary n and arbitrary joint distribution of A and B
upper bound of sender’s expected payoff is what the sender could get if only
marginal distributions of A and B were known.
Proof. Say there exists a signal that gives sender higher payoff than
what he would get if only marginal distributions were known. This
means that there exists a dimension i for which sender’s payoff from
the signal is higher than his optimal payoff for i if only marginal dis-
tribution of i was known. But because receiver’s optimal action about
dimension i is only a function of i’s expected state, this is a contradic-
tion.
This argument can be illustrated by the following reasoning. Say
the receiver has to make a single decision about dimension i. Then
the additional information about some irrelevant state of the world, in
the current case in the form of joint distribution of i and the decision
irrelevant state of the world, can be of no benefit for the sender. In the
current model state of the world for dimension j is irrelevant when the
receiver makes a decision about i.
After describing upper bound for sender’s payoff, now we want
to describe a necessary and sufficient condition for a sequential signal
structure to achieve this upper bound. This will turn out helpful when
finding optimal sequential signal structures.
If only marginal distributions of A and B were known, then we
could calculate sender’s optimal payoff by finding optimal signals for
A and B separately, as suggested by Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011].
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Note also that for these marginal distributions, if the common prior
was joint distribution, such that A and B were independent, then op-
timal sequential signal structure would give sender the same payoff
as when only marginal distributions are known. But if the common
prior is a joint distribution of A and B and they are not independent,
then the signal for one dimension in general will also contain an in-
formation about the other dimension. Before formulating our main
argument, we make following two observations.
First, we have to remember that sender’s value function, V, with
signals, is concave by construction. This is the popular concavifica-
tion argument as developed by Aumann and Maschler [1995] and Ka-
menica and Gentzkow [2011]. For exposition purposes we briefly re-
peat this argument. We follow here Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011].
Denote sender’s value function by v(p). Denote convex hull of v(p)
by co(v). Then, concave closure of v(p) is defined in the following
way:
V(p) ≡ {z|(p, z) ∈ co(v)} (2.1)
Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] show that sender’s optimal payoff
for a prior p0 is V(p0).
We formalise these observations in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Sender’s maximum payoff for belief p is V(p). Sender’s value
function with signals, V, is concave by construction.
Second observation is that the signal for i induces a probability dis-
tribution of posteriors of j that equals to the prior marginal distribution
of j. This follows from the law of total probability. We formalise this
observation in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Signal for i induces a distribution of j’s posteriors, whose expec-
tation equals to j’s prior.
Now we can prove the following result:
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Proposition 2. For arbitrary n and arbitrary joint distribution of A and B,
there exists a sequential signal structure that achieves an upper bound, if and
only if following is true:
There exists a dimension i s.t. first producing an optimal signal for i
induces a distribution of posteriors of j whose support belongs to an interval
on which sender’s value function for j is linear.
Proof. Say there exists such an i. Then, first producing an optimal sig-
nal for i gives following expected payoff for j:
p(si0)V(β(si0)) + ...+ p(sin)V(β(sin)) = V(p(si0)β(si0) + ...+
p(sin)β(sin)) = V(β)
(2.2)
Where, for example p(si0) is a probability of observing signal reali-
sation si0, which leads to the posterior distribution (β(si0)) of j. V(β(si0))
is sender’s payoff for dimension j, when he chooses an optimal signal
for j, when the prior belief is (β(si0)). β is the prior marginal distribu-
tion of j.
First equality follows from our assumption that the value function
of j is linear on the interval to which the support of the distribution
of j’s posteriors belongs, as induced by the optimal signal of i. The
second equality follows from lemma 2.
Now say there does not exist such an i. If the signal for the dimen-
sion i is optimal, then we get the following expression:
p(si0)V(β(si0)) + ...+ p(sin)V(β(sin)) < V(p(si0)β(si0) + ...+
p(sin)β(sin)) = V(β)
(2.3)
Inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and lemma 1, because
V is not linear on the support of the distribution of j’s posteriors as
induced by the signal for i. Equality follows again from lemma 2.
For illustration we will now go back to the example discussed in
the introduction and give graphical arguments.
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Figure 2.2
We want to show graphically how does the correlation between A
and B affect sender’s payoff for A, when he chooses to provide infor-
mation sequentially and the first signal is produced for B. First we
briefly describe how to construct sender’s value function with signals.
One starts with sender’s utility function without signals. Sender’s
utility without signals is 0 if p(A = 1) < 12 and 1 if p(A = 1) ≥ 12
and is given in figure 2.2. Next we construct smallest concave function
weakly bigger than sender’s utility function. So, if only marginal dis-
tributions of A and B were known, then sender’s maximum payoff for
A in the example from the introduction would be 0.90, because small-
est concave function everywhere weakly greater than sender’s value
function is min{2p(A = 1), 1} and is given in figure 2.3.
When the first optimal signal is produced for B, then the poste-
rior of A becomes bigger than 0.5 with positive probability. Therefore,
the expected payoff for A, when the first signal is produced for B, is
smaller than if only marginal distribution of A was known.
In the next section we analyse optimal simultaneous and sequential
signal structures when n = 1 for each dimension.
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Figure 2.3: Concavification of value function; vertical line describes
the set of feasible payoffs for A, when p(A = 1) = 0.45 and A and B
are independent.
2.5 Optimal simultaneous and sequential sig-
nal structures, when n=1
For the motivating example in the introduction, if the first signal is pro-
duced for A then there exists a sequential signal structure that achieves
an upper bound. Following example 2.41 shows that this is not true in
general, i.e. there exist joint distributions, for which there does not
exist a sequential signal structure that achieves the upper bound.
To see this, note the following: if the first signal is produced for
dimension i, then p(i = 0) is in the support of the distribution induced
by the optimal signal for i. But p(j = 1|i = 0) = 35 . Therefore, it
follows from proposition 2 that there does not exist a sequential signal
structure that achieves the upper bound.
This example shows that there exist joint distributions of A and
B, for which whatever the order of persuasion, if the first signal pro-
1This example was suggested by Sergiu Hart.
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Figure 2.4: Example, where no sequential signal can achieve an upper
bound
duced is optimal, than the sequential information provision always
reveals too much information to the receiver, than what is optimal for
the sender.
So, the problem with a sequential signal structure is that it can re-
veal too much information to the receiver. To hinder the receiver to
learn about one dimension from the signal about the other dimension
signal should inform about the joint state.
Now we derive an optimal simultaneous signal that conditions on
the joint states and therefore induces a distribution of posterior beliefs
about joint states.
2.5.1 Optimal simultaneous signal
To calculate optimal simultaneous signal when there are four states,
we can not use concavification of the value function, since we will re-
quire four dimensions to visualise sender’s value function as a func-
tion of distribution of beliefs. Instead, following Bergemann and Mor-
ris [2016a] we will think about signal as a recommendation rule for
the receiver, that should satisfy obedience constraint. For example, if
signal realisation is s(1,1), then receiver would choose 1 for A and B iff
p(i = 1|s(1,1)) ≥ 12 , for i ∈ {A, B}. For ease of notation we will rep-
resent the signal as a joint distribution of decision relevant state space
and signal space, i.e. joint distribution of ωA,B and s(i,j). Let’s denote
joint distribution of A and B in the following way:
B
A p(1, 1) p(1, 0)
p(0, 1) p(0, 0)
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where, for example, p(1, 0) denotes probability of the following
event: A = 1 and B = 0.
We will also use the following notation. Consider states (1, 0) and
(0, 1): let α denote the state that is less likely among these states and
β the state that is more likely. For example if p(1, 0) > p(0, 1), then
α = (0, 1) and β = (1, 0). Also, if p(1, 0) = p(0, 1), then say α = (1, 0)
and β = (0, 1). Then expression p(β) would mean more likely event
among {(1, 0), (0, 1)}, if p(1, 0) 6= p(0, 1) and p(0, 1) otherwise. Also
we will use the above notation of states for recommendations, i.e. s(α)
and s(β).
Now we can proof the following result:
Proposition 3. A optimal simultaneous signal is given by the following joint
distribution:
s/ω (1, 1) α β (0, 0)
s(1,1) p(1, 1) p(α) p(α) p(1, 1)
s(α) 0 0 0 0
s(β) 0 0 p(β)− p(α) p(β)− p(α)
s(0,0) 0 0 0 p(0, 0)− [p(1, 1) + p(β)− p(α)]
Proof. First, note that signal recommendations satisfy obedience con-
straints. Second, note that the payoff from this signal is the same as
what would be if only marginal distributions of A and B were known,
as induced by the joint distribution. Then, it follows from the proposi-
tion 1 that this signal is optimal.
The suggested optimal simultaneous signal is not unique. Note
that the signal does not make a recommendation of α if p(α) < p(β),
i.e. p(sα) = 0; and if p(α) = p(β), then p(sα) = p(sβ). One can
relatively easily construct optimal signals where all four states are rec-
ommended with positive probability. But for all these signals follow-
ing is true: support of the distribution of posterior joint distributions is
such that marginal distributions as induced by these joint distributions
always belong to the support of the distribution of marginal distribu-
tions as induced by optimal signals when only marginal distributions
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of A and B are known. To put it simply, we know that when only
marginal distributions are known, then the support of the distribution
of posteriors as induced by the optimal signal is 0 and 12 . This is true
also for the suggested optimal simultaneous signal. What we are say-
ing is that although the signal is not unique, this property remains true
for other optimal simultaneous signals as considered here. It still re-
mains to be shown formally that this claim is true in general, i.e. for
all optimal simultaneous signals.
After deriving sender’s optimal simultaneous signal, we want to
analyse optimal sequential signal structures.
2.5.2 Sequential signal structure
Our goal is to find optimal sequential signal structures, when n = 1.
As we showed above, sender’s value function with signals for di-
mension i is the following:
V(p(1)) = min{2p(1), 1} (2.4)
From equation (2.4) follows that sender’s value function with sig-
nals is linear on the interval [0, 0.5]. Therefore if the first signal is pro-
duced for A then for a sequential signal structure to achieve the same
payoff as when only marginal distributions are known, it has to be the
case that support of the distribution of B’s posteriors, as induced by
the optimal signal for A, has to be in the interval [0, 0.5]. This follows
from proposition 2.
Corollary 1. There exists a sequential signal structure that achieves the same
expected payoff for the sender as what he optimally can get if only marginal
distributions were known, if and only if following is true: there exists a pair
(i, j) s.t. first producing an optimal signal for i induces a distribution of j’s
posteriors with support [0, 0.5].
We have seen that our motivating example 2.1 allowed sequential
signal structure that achieved an upper bound for the sender, whereas
our second example 2.4 showed that there are joint distributions, for
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which no sequential signal can achieve an upper bound. One differ-
ence between these examples is that in the first example A and B are
positively correlated, whereas in the second case they are negatively
correlated.
Now we want to characterise joint distributions in terms of corre-
lation that allow sequential signal that achieves an upper bound.
Signal for i directly informs only about i. Thus, optimal signal for
i induces two posteriors of j, one for si1 and another for si0. It follows
from the concavification argument that optimal signal for i induces a
distribution of posterior beliefs of i, that has following support: p(i =
1|si1) = 12 and p(i = 1|si0) = 0. Now we are interested in the support
of j′s posterior beliefs, as induced by the optimal signal for i. This
distribution has following support, expressed in terms of conditional
probabilities:
p(j = 1|si1) = 12 [p(j = 1|i = 1) + p(j = 1|i = 0)] (2.5)
p(j = 1|si0) = (j = 1|i = 0) (2.6)
In the current discussion si. denotes an element of an optimal signal
for i, i.e. signal that would be optimal if only marginal distributions of
A and B were known.
It turns out that if A and B are positively correlated then there al-
ways exists a sequential signal structure that achieves an upper bound;
while in the case of negative correlation we characterise a sufficient
and necessary condition for a sequential signal structure to achieve an
upper bound. Before proving these claims, we need to show some
preliminary results.
First note that since we are considering the case when there is a
gain from persuasion in both dimensions, from this trivially follows
that p(j = 1|si0) > 12 only if A and B are negatively correlated.
First we show that if p(j = 1|si1) > 12 then p(i = 1|sj1) < 12 .
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Lemma 3. If p(j = 1|si1) > 12 , then p(i = 1|sj1) < 12 .
Proof. Say p(A = 1|sB1) > 12 . By remembering that p(B = 1|sB1) = 12 ,
then one has the following:
p(A = 1|sB1) = p(A = 1|B = 1)12 + p(A = 1|B = 0)
1
2
>
1
2
(2.7)
After substituting expressions for conditional probabilities and sim-
plifying, one sees that inequality (2.7) holds iff following is true:
p(1, 1)p(1, 0) > p(0, 0)p(0, 1). (2.8)
Note that p(1, 1) < p(0, 0), otherwise for at least one dimension
p(i = 1) > 12 . Therefore p(1, 0) > p(0, 1).
Say now following is also true:
p(B = 1|sA1) > 12 (2.9)
By the same argument as above, one can show that inequality (2.9)
holds iff
p(1, 1)p(0, 1) > p(0, 0)p(1, 0) (2.10)
which is a contradiction.
It is also straightforward that if A and B are negatively correlated
then p(j = 1|si1) < 12 . We formalise this in the next lemma.
Lemma 4. If A and B are negatively correlated then p(j = 1|si1) < 12 .
Proof. For concreteness consider the case when the first signal is pro-
duced for A. We want to show that if A and B are negatively corre-
lated then p(B = 1|sA1) < 12 . First note that negative correlation,
when there are two states for each dimension, implies the following:
p(i = 1|j = 1) < p(i = 1) < p(i = 1|j = 0). By using the law of total
probability, we can express probability of B = 1 in the following way:
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p(B = 1) = p(B = 1|A = 1)p(A = 1) + p(B = 1|A = 0)p(A = 0).
The result follows from noting that p(A = 1|sA1) > p(A = 1) and
p(B = 1) < 12 .
Now we can prove the following result:
Proposition 4. (a) If A and B are positively correlated then there exists a
sequential signal structure that achieves an upper bound.
(b) If A and B are negatively correlated then there exists a sequential sig-
nal structure that achieves an upper bound iff following is true: there exists a
pair i and j, s.t. : p(j = 1|i = 0) ≤ 12 .
Proof. (a) Say A and B are positively correlated. Then we know from
lemma (3) together with the fact that p(j = 1|i = 0) < 12 is always
true for positive correlation, that there exists a random variable j, s.t
support of the distribution of it’s posteriors as induced by the optimal
signal of i is always in the interval [0, 0.5]. The result then follows from
corollary (1).
(b) Say there exists a pair i and j s.t. p(j = 1|i = 0) ≤ 12 . Then it
follows from lemma (4) that there exists a random variable j s.t. sup-
port of it’s distribution as induced by the optimal signal of i belongs
to the interval [0, 0.5]. The result then follows from corollary (1). Say
there does not exist a pair for which p(j = 1|i = 0) ≤ 12 is true. Then it
follows again from corollary (1) that there does not exist a sequential
signal structure that achieves an upper bound.
Based on the previous results one can also give a simple character-
isation of sequential signal structures that achieve an upper bound.
Corollary 2. If A and B are positively correlated, then following sequential
signal structure achieves an upper bound: first produce an optimal signal for
the dimension, whose expectation is not smaller than the expectation of the
other dimension. Given new posteriors induced by this signal, then produce
an optimal signal for another dimension.
Corollary 3. If A and B are negatively correlated and there exists a pair, s.t.
p(j = 1|i = 0) ≤ 0, then following sequential signal structure achieves
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an upper bound: first produce an optimal signal for i and then given new
posteriors of j, produce an optimal signal for j.
As we have seen in the example 2.4, when A and B are negatively
correlated, then there exists a joint distribution for which there is no
sequential signal structure that achieves an upper bound. So, question
remains what is an optimal sequential signal in this case, i.e. when
following is true:
p(A = 1|B = 0) > 1
2
(2.11)
p(B = 1|A = 0) > 1
2
(2.12)
The intuition is that the inefficiency increases in the distance p(j =
1|i = 0)− 12 . It turns out that the intuition is correct and it is optimal
first signal to produce for i, for which following is true:
p(i = 1|j = 0) ≥ p(j = 1|i = 0) (2.13)
Before proving this result, we want to make some observations,
that will turn out helpful. First note that it can never be optimal for the
sender to not persuade receiver about some dimension. We formulate
this observation in the following lemma, but first we give a definition
of an uninformative signal.
Definition 1. A signal is uninformative, if cardinality of the set of signal
realisations is singleton. A signal is informative, if it is not uninformative.
Lemma 5. For sender it is never optimal to not produce informative signal
about some dimension.
Proof. Say sender decides to produce uninformative signal about di-
mension A. Then, because order of persuasion is not given, sender can
decide to produce first signal about B. Note that for any signal of B,
posterior of A will be smaller than 0.5 with positive probability. Then
sender strictly gains from producing signal for A.
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Now we want to argue that whatever the dimension, for which the
first signal is produced, this signal should be the same that the sender
would choose if only marginal distributions of A and B were known.
Lemma 6. Say the sender decides to produce the first signal about dimension
i. Then the sequential signal structure is optimal only if the signal for i is the
same that the sender would choose if only marginal distributions of A and B
were known.
Proof. From lemma 5 follows that whatever the dimension for which
the first signal is produced, posterior for this dimension should be-
come at least 0.5 with positive probability. For simplicity we assume
that the first signal is produced for A. It is not difficult to see that it can
never be optimal to produce a signal for which posterior of A becomes
bigger than 0.5. Examining expected payoff for B graphically should
be enough to see that this claim is correct, by remembering that A and
B are negatively correlated.
Another possibility could be that the signal for A is such that the
posterior of B never becomes bigger than 0.5, so that the expected pay-
off from B is the same as when only marginal distributions are known.
We will show that this can not be optimal.
First we want to calculate sender’s optimal expected payoff when
the signal for A is such that the support of the distribution of B’s pos-
teriors is [0, 0.5]. Optimisation implies following: we want to find
signal for A, that has following properties: p(A = 1|sA1) = 12 and
p(A = 1|sA0) is such that p(B = 1|p(A = 1|sA0)) = 12 . Solving for
optimal signal of A under this constraint gives the following expected
payoff:
(p(B = 1|A = 0)− p(B = 1|A = 1))p(A = 1)− p(B = 1|A = 0) + 0.5
0.5− 0.5(p(B = 1|A = 0) + p(B = 1|A = 1)) + 2p(B = 1)
(2.14)
Now we want to calculate sender’s payoff from a sequential signal
structure, when the first signal is produced for A and it is the same
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signal that would be optimal if only marginal distribution of A was
known. This is given by the following expression:
1+ 2p(A = 1) [p(B = 1|A = 1) + p(B = 1|A = 0)] (2.15)
Now, after substituting expressions for conditional distributions
and expressing marginal distributions in terms of joint distribution,
it turns out that 2.14 can never be bigger than 2.15, when A and B
are negatively correlated and prior expectation for each dimension is
smaller than 0.5.
This completes the proof.
Now we can prove the following result:
Proposition 5. If A and B are negatively correlated and if a sequential signal
is chosen, s.t. first signal is produced for i for which following is true: p(i =
1|j = 0) ≥ p(j = 1|i = 0), then there does not exist a sequential signal
structure that achieves higher expected payoff for the sender.
Proof. If p(i = 1|j = 0) ≤ 12 , then we showed above that such a signal
achieves an upper bound.
Say now p(j = 1|i = 0) > 12 , so that no sequential signal achieves
an upper bound. It follows from lemmas 5 and 6 that whatever the
dimension for which the first signal is produced, this signal should be
the same as when only marginal distributions of A and B are known.
Now it remains to compare which of the two sequential signals give
higher payoff.
First producing an optimal signal for A gives following expected
payoff to the sender:
1+ 2[p(1, 1) + p(1, 0)][
p(1, 1)
p(1, 1) + p(1, 0)
+
p(0, 1)
p(0, 1) + p(0, 0)
] (2.16)
Sender’s expected payoff from producing first signal for B is:
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1+ 2[p(1, 1) + p(0, 1)][
p(1, 1)
p(1, 1) + p(0, 1)
+
p(1, 0)
p(1, 0) + p(0, 0)
] (2.17)
After subtracting expression 2.17 from expression 2.16, one gets:
[p(0, 1)− p(1, 0)][p(1, 1)p(0, 0)− p(1, 0)p(0, 1)] (2.18)
First note that the negative correlation implies that the second term
is negative. Regarding the sign of the first term, one has the following:
if p(B = 1|A = 0) > (<)p(A = 1|B = 0) then the first term is positive
(negative). This ends the proof.
Now we have completely analysed optimal simultaneous and se-
quential signal structures when n = 1 for each dimension. We derived
an optimal simultaneous signal that always achieves an upper bound
of sender’s payoff. Then we fully characterised optimal sequential sig-
nal structures. We characterised joint distributions for which sender
gets the same payoff as what he would get from the simultaneous sig-
nal. So for this class of joint distributions the problem allows simple
approach, since one can consider signals on the smaller state space.
Now, after having fully analysed the binary case, we want to un-
derstand when does a sequential signal achieve the same payoff as
when only marginal distributions are known for the case when n = 2
for each dimension.
2.6 Characterising conditions for a sequential
signal structure to achieve an upper bound
when n=2
Our goal is again to characterise conditions for a sequential signal
structure to achieve an upper bound. First step is to characterise op-
timal signals and value function with 3 states for one dimension only.
The derivation of optimal signals we relegate to the appendix and here
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give sender’s value function.
Lemma 7. When n = 2, receiver’s value function for one dimensional per-
suasion problem is the following:
2(p(1) + 2p(2)) i f p(1) + 2p(2) < 0.5 (2.19)
2p(2) + p(1) + 0.5 i f 0.5 ≤ p(1) + 2p(2) < 1.5 and p(1) ≤ 0.5 (2.20)
2p(2) + 1 i f 0.5 ≤ p(1) + 2p(2) < 1.5 and p(1) > 0.5 (2.21)
2 i f p(1) + 2p(2) ≥ 1.5 (2.22)
Now we are ready to characterise conditions for the existence of
a sequential signal structure to achieve an upper bound. Value func-
tion is linear function on three different intervals and constant if the
expected state is at least 1.5. Therefore for a sequential signal structure
to achieve an upper bound it must be the case that the posteriors of B,
if the first signal is produced for A, should remain in the interval, to
which the prior belongs. We formalise this in the next corollary.
Corollary 4. There exists a sequential signal structure that achieves an upper
bound, iff following is true: there exists a pair i and j, s.t. first producing an
optimal signal for i, the support of the distribution of posteriors of j belongs
to the same interval to which the prior of j belonged.
Proof. This follows from proposition 2.
Appendix 2.A Optimal signals when n=2 and
only one decision is to be made
First we describe receiver’s best action as a function of his beliefs. If
all three states are possible, then receiver’s optimal action is:
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Figure 2.5
0 i f 2p(2) + p(1) <
1
2
1 i f
1
2
≤ 2p(2) + p(1) < 3
2
2 i f 2p(2) + p(1) ≥ 3
2
Receiver chooses action closest to the expected state. To derive
sender’s value function and optimal posterior distributions we will
construct sender’s value function without signal and from this we
get the value function with signals by concavification. Although re-
ceiver is only interested in the expected state, the value function of the
sender is a function of the distribution of states and not an expecta-
tion. Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011] discuss this question in some
detail. Therefore we have to analyse the value function of the sender
as a function of two probabilities, p(1) and p(2). The value function
without signals is a step function with values 0, 1 and 2 and is given by
figure 2.5. By concavification of this function one gets sender’s value
function with signals, as depicted in figure 2.6.
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Figure 2.6
We derive now optimal distribution of posterior beliefs, s.t. ex-
pectation equals prior. This is equivalent to deriving optimal signals.
To derive an analytic expression of the value function it will be help-
ful to look at the domain of the value function. Figure 2.7 gives the
level-areas of different values of the function. First let’s consider the
area labeled by (a). These are the combinations of p(1) and p(2), for
which the expected value is smaller than 0.5 and therefore receiver’s
optimal action is 0. One can see that the optimal signal in this case
means choosing distribution of posteriors s.t. it’s expectation equals
to the prior and support of this distribution is 2p(2) + p(1) = 12 and
p(2) = p(1) = 0. Solution of this problem is the following:
p(s1) = 2(p(1) + 2p(2)) (2.23)
p(s2) = 0 (2.24)
p(1|s1) = p(1)2(p(1) + 2p(2)) (2.25)
p(2|s1) = p(2)2(p(1) + 2p(2)) (2.26)
p(1|s0) = 0 (2.27)
p(2|s0) = 0 (2.28)
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Figure 2.7
Now we want to find optimal distribution of posteriors for the pri-
ors, for which the best action of the receiver is 1. The distribution of
priors for which receiver’s optimal action is 1 is labeled by (b). For
these distributions of priors the goal is to induce distributions of pos-
teriors which make actions 2 and 1 optimal for the receiver. Here one
has to distinguish between two cases: p(1) < 0.5 and p(1) > 0.5.
When p(1) < 0.5, then solution of this problem is the following:
p(s1) = 1.5− p(1)− 2p(2)) (2.29)
p(s2) = p(1) + 2p(2)− 0.5 (2.30)
p(1|s1) = p(1) (2.31)
p(1|s2) = p(1) (2.32)
p(2|s2) = 0.75− 0.5p(1) (2.33)
p(2|s1) = 0.25− 0.5p(1) (2.34)
If p(1) > 0.5, then solution is the following:
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p(s1) = 1− 2p(2) (2.35)
p(s2) = 2p(2) (2.36)
p(1|s2) = 0.5 (2.37)
p(2|s2) = 0.5 (2.38)
p(1|s1) = 0.5 p(1)− p(2)0.5− p(2) (2.39)
p(2|s1) = 0 (2.40)
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Chapter 3
Identifying the reasons for
coordination failure in a
laboratory experiment
3.1 Introduction
If you have lost your spouse in a department store and both of you are
trying to find each other, the answer to the (seemingly simple) ques-
tion of “Will she look for me at the coffee bar or at the exit?” depends
not only on the answer to the question “Does she think I am looking
for her at the coffee bar or at the exit?” (i.e., something we will call
the first-order belief) but also on the answers to “Does she think that
I think that she thinks that I am looking for her at the coffee bar or at
the exit?” (i.e., the second-order belief or “What is her first-order be-
lief?”) and on infinitely more levels of beliefs. This paper addresses
the question if people actually use beliefs of a higher order.
When modeling human behavior, most works assume that players
have common knowledge about the structure of the game, i.e., that all
players know the structure, that all players know that everyone else
knows the structure and so on.1 Furthermore, we assume that players
1However, there is a (mostly theoretical) literature on universal type spaces, in-
troduced by Harsanyi [1967/68] and formalized by Mertens and Zamir [1985] and
Brandenburger and Dekel [1993], analysis games without common knowledge.
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do not only have common knowledge about publicly known proper-
ties of the game but also about the distributions of unknown factors of
the game, like the other players’ types (for example if I’d rather wait at
the coffee bar or the exit). The absence of common knowledge leads to
complex belief hierarchies, so called higher-order beliefs. The first level
of these beliefs, so called first-order beliefs, might be a belief over the
other player’s type. A second-order belief would then be a belief over
the belief of the other player about your type (i.e., a belief over the
other player’s first-order belief) and so on ad infinitum.
In the game theoretical literature many different assumptions and
models of higher-order beliefs exist and many of these lead to very
different predictions even in simple games like the pure coordination
game we are using in this paper.2 The question, what kind of model
of higher-order beliefs players actually use, seems to be an empirical
question which we are trying to address in this paper.
To do so, we take up the experimental results and setup of Blume
and Gneezy [2010], in which there is an issue of cognitive difficulties,
to analyze the effects of higher-order beliefs. Blume and Gneezy [2010]
used a slightly difficult coordination game (the so-called 5-sector disc),
in which there is a better (i.e., risk- and payoff-dominant) option which
is harder to find. They were able to show that participants form beliefs
about the cognitive abilities of other participants and, if these beliefs
are pessimistic, they hinder coordination between the players (i.e., that
“beliefs matter”). However, they have not taken into account the effect
of higher-order beliefs about cognitive abilities. Therefore, we modify
their experimental setup in order to distinguish the effect of first-order
beliefs players form about the cognitive ability of their opponents (i.e.,
if players trust in the cognitive ability of their partners) and higher-
order beliefs.
We introduce a new treatment in which participants guess what
other participants play against themselves. This allows us to identify
first-order beliefs and therefore separate first- from higher-order be-
2A brief overview of some models of higher-order beliefs can be found in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 and a more detailed discussion in Section 3.B.
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liefs.
Using the data from these treatments, we can answer the following
three questions:
• Are players able to coordinate in the absence of common knowl-
edge?
• Can coordination fail because players underestimate the skill of
the other players? Or, in other words, do first-order beliefs mat-
ter?
• Can coordination fail because players think ”too much“ about
what others might think? Or, in other words, do higher-order
beliefs matter?
Using Blume and Gneezy’s [2000] 5-sector disc, we were able to
find answers to all three questions: In the experiment, we were able to
reproduce Blume and Gneezy’s [2010] result, that the majority of play-
ers had no problem choosing the Pareto-dominant equilibrium strat-
egy of the game (i.e., coordination is possible). Furthermore, some
players switch to the worse equilibrium strategy because of first- and
higher-order beliefs (i.e. first- and higher-order beliefs matter).
More important applications than the search for ones husband or
wife in a department store are suggested by recent studies in sociol-
ogy and development studies, like Bicchieri [2005]. She suggests that
common knowledge plays a significant role in the fight against female
genital mutilation. Our results might help to improve our understand-
ing of why some organizations are significantly more successful in the
fight against female genital mutilation (FGM) than others. This appli-
cation is discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.
Apart from the FGM application, higher-order beliefs have applica-
tions in many different fields. For example, they might be a reason for
bank runs (i.e., the belief that a bank will be fine but a fear that others
might think that the bank is in trouble might cause a bank run on this
bank), arms races and financial crises.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.1.1, we will give
an overview of the relevant literature and how our work fits into it.
Then we will explain an example of the game we use in Section 3.2.
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In Section 3.3 we will explain the model. This is followed by the ex-
perimental design in Section 3.4 and the results of the experiment in
Section 3.5. The aforementioned application to the fight against female
genital mutilation is discussed in Section 3.6. Finally, we will conclude
in Section 3.7.
3.1.1 Related works
There is a large theoretical literature, beginning with the seminal pa-
per on the “email game” by Rubinstein [1989], showing that higher-
order beliefs play a role in determining the outcome of a game. For
instance, Carlsson and Van Damme [1993] use higher-order beliefs (in
their model of global games) to identify the risk-dominant equilibrium
as the unique rationalizable outcome of the coordination game. This
uniqueness result spawned a large applied literature on, among other
areas, bank runs and arms races, in e.g. Morris and Shin [1998], Morris
and Shin [2004], Baliga and Sjöström [2004], Corsetti, Dasgupta, Mor-
ris, and Shin [2004], and Goldstein and Pauzner [2005]. Weinstein and
Yildiz [2007b], however, have shown that this uniqueness result, that
this whole literature depends on, is fragile to the exact specification
of the higher-order belief model. Other “nearby” higher-order belief
models have very different “unique” predictions. In fact, they show
that any rationalizable outcome of the original game, can be obtained
as the unique rationalizable strategy profile of some higher-order be-
lief model.
Weinstein and Yildiz [2007a] establish a condition, called “global
stability under uncertainty”. This condition implies that, if the change
in equilibrium actions is small in the change of kth-order beliefs and
higher, equilibria can be approximated by the equilibrium with at most
kth-order beliefs. Unfortunately, pure coordination games do not ful-
fill “global stability under uncertainty”.
Strzalecki [2014] and Kneeland [2016] develop different non-equilibrium
approaches, inspired by the experimental literature discussed later, us-
ing bounded levels of reasoning to explain behavior in coordinated at-
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tack problems (e.g. Rubinstein’s [1989] email game).
A more in-depth discussion of models of higher-order beliefs and their
predictions of the results of our experiment can be found in Section 3.B.
The experimental literature, however, has so far mostly focused on
strategic uncertainty. The most prominent example for this is probably
the literature on level-k thinking or cognitive hierarchy models, which
was started by Nagel [1995] and Stahl and Wilson [1995]. In recent
years, there have been many studies conducted, using and analyzing
level-k reasoning, for example Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt [1998], Costa-
Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta [2001], Camerer, Ho, and Chong [2004]
and Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich [2008]. For a recent survey,
see Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri [2013].
But there also have been works which do not focus on strategic
uncertainty. For example Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels [2004],
Cornand [2006], Cabrales, Nagel, and Armenter [2007] and Duffy and
Ochs [2012] who directly test implications of the theory of global games,
i.e. individuals play an incomplete information game as in Carlsson
and Van Damme [1993]. The results however, are mixed and range
from full support to full rejection of the predictions made by global
games.
Another, closely related work is Kneeland [2015], in which she ex-
plores the level of rationality, a requirement for higher-order beliefs, of
players experimentally. She shows that, in her experiment, 94% of all
players are rational with decreasing numbers for second- (71%), third-
(44%) and forth-order (22%) rationality.
We explore experimentally the “depth of reasoning” individuals
employ when playing slightly difficult coordination games. In fact we
want to abstract away from purely strategic concerns by only looking
at coordination games in which the incentives of the players are per-
fectly aligned and a Pareto-dominant equilibrium exists. The funda-
mental uncertainty in the model will be one about the cognitive abili-
ties of the opponents.
Differences in cognitive abilities have been studied before, for ex-
ample by Gill and Prowse [2016], who have shown that more cogni-
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tively able subjects converge, in repeated p-beauty contests, more fre-
quently to equilibrium play and earn more. Furthermore, Proto, Rus-
tichini, and Sofianos [2014] have shown that intelligence affects the
results of repeatedly played prisoner’s dilemmas, in which groups of
higher intelligence tend to cooperate more frequently in later stages
of the game. Agranov, Potamites, Schotter, and Tergiman [2012] have
shown, by manipulating the perception of the cognitive levels of other
players, that beliefs about the level of reasoning do play a signifi-
cant role in the presence of strategic uncertainty. Alaoui and Penta
[2015] establish a framework in which the depth of reasoning is en-
dogenously determined by different cognitive costs of reasoning.
The way we model cognitive differences however, builds on an-
other branch of literature. Motivated by Schelling’s [1960] discussion
of focal points, a variety of authors have tried to formally capture his
ideas, most notably Bacharach [1993] and Sugden [1995]. The impor-
tance of focal points is supported by many experiments, for example
by Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden [1994], who have replicated Schelling’s
results and have shown that coordinating on a focal point is different
from accidental coordination. Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich
[2008] have shown that, in a pure coordination game with symmet-
ric payoffs, salient labels lead to a high percentage of coordination
whereas even slight asymmetries in payoffs might lead to a coordi-
nation failure. Isoni, Poulsen, Sugden, and Tsutsui [2013] extend the
analysis to bargaining problems and show that payoff-irrelevant clues
help to improve coordination, even if there is no efficient or equal di-
vision.
In the absence of clues however, the theory of focal points can not
be applied. Formally the absence of clues can be modeled as sym-
metries between strategies and players in a given game. In fact Nash
[1951] has already discussed equilibrium under symmetry restrictions
(and shown existence also of such symmetric (mixed) equilibria for
finite games). Crawford and Haller [1990] have defined symmetries
in games and used these definitions to see what focal points in highly
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symmetric repeated coordination games would look like.3 Blume [2000]
has further developed this symmetry concept to talk about play under
the absence of a common language. Other notions of symmetries have
been put forward and studied in Harsanyi and Selten [1988], Casajus
[2000] and Casajus [2001]. Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics [2013] have then
clarified the difference between different notions of symmetries and
characterized all the possible ways a frame (the way a game is pre-
sented to players in the lab, for instance) could lead to different sym-
metry restrictions (and therefore to different focal points).
All these models of symmetries and restrictions are implicitly or
explicitly investigated under the assumption of perfectly rational in-
dividuals. However, identifying all symmetries (and especially non-
symmetries) in a game can be a difficult task. Bacharach [1993] has
proposed his variable frame theory to allow for individual players
with different states of mind or, as developed by Blume [2000] and
employed by Blume and Gneezy [2000] and Blume and Gneezy [2010],
with different cognitive abilities.
This finally brings us to the goal of our study. We want to take up
the experimental results and setup of Blume and Gneezy [2010] to an-
alyze the effects of higher-order beliefs. They were able to show that
participants form beliefs about the cognitive abilities of other partic-
ipants and, if these beliefs are pessimistic, they hinder coordination
between the players. However, they have not taken into account the
effect of higher-order beliefs about cognitive abilities. Therefore, we
modify their experimental setup in order to distinguish the effect of
first-order beliefs players form about the cognitive ability of their op-
ponents and higher-order beliefs.
3Bhaskar [2000] and more comprehensively Kuzmics, Palfrey, and Rogers [2014],
have studied theoretically and in the latter case also experimentally, what the possi-
ble focal points of the symmetric repeated battle-of-the-sexes and its generalizations
could be.
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3.2 Example
In this example, players only have access to two strategies l and h and
are trying to coordinate on one of them; the payoffs are as depicted in
the payoff matrix in Figure 3.1. As (h, h) has a higher equilibrium pay-
ment it would therefore be the focal point (and the risk- and payoff-
dominant Nash equilibrium) of this particular game.4
l h
l 1,1 0,0
h 0,0 3,3
Figure 3.1: Payoff matrix of a high-cognition player
However, if we introduce cognitive differences, i.e., if action h is
only available to a high-cognition player and low-cognition players are
not aware of the existence of action h (and the high type) and are there-
fore forced to play l, beliefs about the other player’s type might lead to
coordination failure,5 even if both players are high-cognition players.
The driving force of this result is the absence of common knowledge
about the players’ type or the fraction of high cognition players.
This game models the situation in which one player is not aware
that there even is an action to take (i.e., they don’t have complete
knowledge about the structure of the game).
The following two examples show how beliefs could lead to coordi-
nation failure between two high-cognition players: First imagine that
the first player (she) thinks that the other player (he) is a low-cognition
player. Then she would play l, as he would have no other choice than
playing l. This is what we will call coordination failure due to a first-
order belief. The second example is that she thinks that his type is
high, he thinks she is a high-type player but she thinks that he thinks
4Or, in the words of Luce and Raiffa [1957] and Schelling [1960] a solution in the
strict sense.
5In this paper, we follow the notion for coordination failure of Van Huyck, Bat-
talio, and Beil [1990], i.e., the failure to coordinate on the best achievable outcome.
That means, even if two high-cognition players coordinate on a Pareto-inferior equi-
librium we will call it coordination failure.
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her type is low. Again, she would play l as she thinks that he will play
l. Here we have a coordination problem due to her second-order be-
lief. Therefore, even if both players have the ability to coordinate on
the best equilibrium, they might end up failing to coordinate on the
better equilibrium (h, h).
The existence of infinitely many levels of beliefs and that a “bad”
belief at any level makes the player switch to the “bad” strategy l
makes one wonder, if, even with a high fraction of high-cognition play-
ers, coordination on the good equilibrium (h, h) is possible.
Therefore, the first main question this paper addresses is if coordi-
nation on the good equilibrium can be expected even in the absence of
common knowledge. The second question is if systematic underesti-
mation of other players’ skills can be a source of coordination failure,
or if first-order beliefs matter. The third and last question is if higher-
order beliefs, e.g. if she thinks that he thinks that she is a low type, are
a possible cause for coordination failure or if these levels of reasoning
are too complex and play no significant role in coordination games.
The concepts of coordination games and higher-order beliefs will
be formalized in the following section and the experimental design
will be explained in Section 3.4.
3.3 The model
We begin by defining a pure coordination game for two players.
Definition 1 (Pure coordination game). A pure coordination game is a
game with 2 players, who each have access to m different actions ({a1, a2, . . . , am}).
In this game payoffs of a player i are defined as
ui(ai, aj) =
xi ∀i, j : i = j0 otherwise
with xm > xm−1 > · · · > x1.
This means that each player can choose from the same set of actions
and whenever they have picked the same action they get the same
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payoff and if they don’t manage to coordinate their actions, both get
nothing. Furthermore, there is a Pareto ordering of these equilibria.
Figure 3.2 shows an example of a pure coordination game with three
possible actions.
a1 a2 a3
a1 1, 1 0,0 0,0
a2 0,0 2, 2 0,0
a3 0,0 0,0 4, 4
Figure 3.2: A pure coordination game
Let us now introduce cognitive differences into this pure coordi-
nation game. For the sake of simplicity, we are only introducing two
cognitive types, a low-cognitive type and a high-cognitive type. The
latter has access to a “better” strategy, which is not available to the low
type. Furthermore, the low type is unaware of the existence of the high
type, as proposed by Bacharach [1993].
This means that the low type has no complete knowledge about the
structure of the game and therefore common knowledge about it is, as
long as there is at least one low cognition player, not possible.
Definition 2 (Pure coordination game with cognitive differences). A
pure coordination game with cognitive differences is a game with 2 play-
ers. Each of the players has a type ti ∈ {low, high} and has access to
different strategies, depending on his type ti. The types of a player
are her private information. Low cognition players have access to
{a1, a2, . . . , am−1} whereas high cognition players also have access to
the action am, i.e. to {a1, a2, . . . , am}. Furthermore, low cognition play-
ers have no knowledge about the existence of the high type or action
am.
In this game payoffs of a player i are defined as
ui(ai, aj) =
xi ∀i, j : i = j0 otherwise
with xm > xm−1 ≥ · · · ≥ x1.
66
These cognitive differences can also be thought of as symmetry
constraints on attainable strategies, as proposed by Crawford and Haller
[1990] and further developed by Blume [2000] and Alós-Ferrer and
Kuzmics [2013]. Here, the high-cognition player has less symmetry
constrains and has therefore more attainable strategies.
In the experiment we are using the notion of cognitive differences
as proposed by Blume and Gneezy [2010] (a generalization of Bacharach’s
variable frame theory, using different symmetry constraints on the at-
tainable strategies as used in Blume [2000]).
For a formal description of the belief hierarchy of these games,
we would like to refer to Section 3.A. However, we believe for un-
derstanding the results of this work, the idea conveyed in this section
should suffice.
3.4 Experimental design
Measuring higher-order beliefs is very complicated, as there is an ”un-
certainty principle“ (as already discussed by Blume and Gneezy [2010])
at work; i.e., it is hard to measure beliefs without introducing or chang-
ing them.6 Furthermore, introducing absence of common knowledge
is difficult; When told that they are given a random number, subjects
usually assume that it is drawn from a uniform distribution. Explic-
itly stating that the distribution is unknown leads to a myriad of other
problems. Subjects could, for example, assume a strategic selection of
the distribution by the experimenter. Finally, we need to have some
sort of control over the fraction of high-cognition players, so that the
action only available to the high-cognition players is the one with the
highest expected payoff (see Section 3.B).
We solve all three problems by utilizing Blume and Gneezy’s [2000]
5-sector disc. This is a disc with 5 equally large sectors on it, 2 black
and 3 white, as depicted in Figure 3.3.7
6Either by making the subjects realize that there might be something like a higher-
order belief or by them trying to be a good subject (Orne [1962]). A more extensive
discussion of this uncertainty principle can be found in Section 3.C.
7There is a second version of this disc, with a significantly harder to find distinct
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Figure 3.3: 5-sector-disc
The disc has the same sectors on the front- and backside of the disc
and can be flipped and rotated.
As the disc can be flipped, the subjects face symmetry constraints
and can therefore not distinguish all five sectors. These symmetries
cannot be overcome and therefore not all Nash equilibria are possi-
ble given the particular frame. Only certain “attainable” equilibria are
possible, as defined originally in Crawford and Haller [1990], and fur-
ther developed by Blume [2000] and Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics [2013].
The property of this disc which is most important for this paper is
that it has a single distinct white sector: The sector adjacent to both
black sectors (Figure 3.3).8
For the subjects there are then, in principle, three distinguishable
sets of sectors: the black sectors (B), the uniquely identifiable white
sector (D), and the other white sectors (W’).
The key assumption behind the experiment (and also behind Blume
and Gneezy [2000] and Blume and Gneezy [2010] and very much sup-
ported by their findings), is that not all subjects realize that there is
a uniquely identifiable sector, which leads to two different cognitive
types, the high type, who can identify the distinct sector, and the low
type, who cannot.
sector, with adjacent black sectors. However, for this disc, the fraction of players who
were able to identify the distinct sector is too small (i.e., not satisfying the conditions
derived in Section 3.B). Some choice data from this ”hard disc“ can be found in the
Online Appendix.
8More about the properties of this disc can be found in Blume and Gneezy [2000].
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The low type then faces an additional symmetry constraint and has
only two distinguishable sets of sectors to choose from: One of the two
black sectors (B) or one of the three white sectors (W).
Note that the lower type has no knowledge about the existence of
another type or the distinct sector.
The subjects then played three treatments in a random order with-
out feedback after hearing and reading the instructions and complet-
ing an extensive quiz:9
The Self Treatment in which the subject gets the disc twice, every time
randomly turned and rotated, and gets £5 if she picks the same sector
twice.
In the Prediction Treatment one subject (she) is told that another sub-
ject (he) plays the Self Treatment (with a possibly differently turned and
rotated disc). She has to pick one sector and every time he picks the
sector she picked, she gets £2.5.10
Finally, the Coordination Treatment, in which two players pick simul-
taneously a sector on a (randomly turned and rotated) disc and, if both
players pick the same sector, both receive £5.
3.4.1 Predictions
How can we use this design to test the three initial questions stated in
the introduction? Let us have a look how we expect low- and high-
cognition players to behave in the three different treatments.
In the Self Treatment a high-cognition player has 9 possible choices:
She can pick any of three actions (D, B, W ′) in the first stage and then
pick any of the three actions in the second stage. This decision problem
for the high-cognition player has a unique optimal solution: pick the
distinct sector twice, giving her a probability to win of 1.
9For the complete instructions and a description of the quiz see the Online Ap-
pendix.
10Adding another treatment in which subjects have to predict what another sub-
jects does in the Prediction Treatment would, in theory, allow to explicitly check
for second-order beliefs (or, when repeating this any higher-order belief). However,
don’t belief this will work with the 5-sector disc, as it probably requires too much
attention and mental effort which most subjects might not be willing to exert.
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A low-cognition player is only aware of four possible choices: He
can pick B or W in the first stage and then pick B or W in the second
stage. The low-cognition player also has a unique optimal choice: pick
B in both stages, giving him a probability to win of 12 .
Therefore, we would expect a high-cognition player to choose the
distinct sector twice and a low-cognition player to pick a black sector
twice.
In the Prediction Treatment, the action taken by a subject should
only depend on her type and her first-order belief about the type of the
other player. A low-cognition player will always choose B, whereas a
risk-neutral, high-cognition player should pick D if his belief that the
other player is also of the high type is at least 13 and B otherwise.
11
The coordination treatment is best depicted as a bi-matrix game
with three (for the high-cognition player) and two (for the low-cognition
player) pure strategies, with winning probabilities as depicted in Fig-
ure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. We expect a low-cognition player to play B,
as it is the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium, whereas a high-
cognition player’s choice depends on her belief hierarchy: If anywhere
in her complete hierarchy a belief lower than 13 (or
1
2 for very risk
averse players) that the other player is a high-cognition player or that
the other player thinks that she is a high-cognition player, . . . (or, in
short, that there is no common-p belief among the high-cognition play-
ers of 13 or higher, that both players are high-cognition players), she
will choose B, otherwise she will choose D.
W ′ B D
W ′ 12 0 0
B 0 12 0
D 0 0 1
Figure 3.4: High-cognition
player winning probabilities
W B
W 13 0
B 0 12
Figure 3.5: Low-cognition
player winning probabilities
Unfortunately, neither the theoretical nor the experimental litera-
11Allowing for risk-averse players, this fraction has to be between 13 and
1
2 , de-
pending on the degree of risk aversion.
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ture on higher-order beliefs can tell us which of the two will be cho-
sen. Even small variations in the assumptions of theoretical models of
higher-order beliefs can generate both equilibria. Therefore, this ques-
tion seems to be an empirical one, which we are trying to answer in this
paper. However, a more detailed explanation of how different models
of higher-order beliefs work in our game can be found in Section 3.B.
3.4.2 Hypotheses
Using our design, we can formulate three hypotheses to test the three
research questions stated earlier. In the following we will use a short-
hand for players’ strategies such as: "W’W’ B D" means that a player
selected one of the two white sectors twice in the Self Treatment, one
of the black sectors in the Prediction Treatment and the distinct sector
in the Coordination Treatment.
The answer to our first question ”Is coordination possible? “ or,
in the words of our model ”Do high-cognition players use the first-
best strategy am despite the absence of common knowledge? “ is sug-
gested by the literature on focal points (e.g., Sugden [1995] or Craw-
ford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich [2008]) and supported by the exper-
imental literature on coordination games (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio,
and Beil [1990] or Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross [1990]):
Hypothesis 1 (Coordination is possible). High-cognition players choose
in the Coordination Treatment D more often than any other choice.
We are using a within-subject design to test the hypotheses: Only
high-cognition players can identify the best equilibrium, so we don’t
have to consider other types. We can identify these players with the
help of the the Self Treatment. If high-cognition players, i.e., the ones
who have been able to identify “D” in the Self Treatment, coordinate
on D in the Coordination Treatment we know that coordination is pos-
sible, even in the absence of common knowledge.
The next two hypotheses extend on Blume and Gneezy’s [2010] hy-
pothesis that “beliefs matter”: Hypothesis 2 formalizes the question
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“Does coordination fail because some high-cognition players underes-
timate the fraction of high-cognition players? “ or ”Is there coordina-
tion failure due to first-order beliefs? “
Hypothesis 2 (First-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition sub-
jects who choose a black sector in the Prediction Treatment and Cooperation
Treatment, i.e., play “DD B B”.
We already know that we can identify players’ types with the help
of the Self Treatment. Furthermore, the Prediction Treatment identi-
fies players who think that more than 13 of the other players can not
identify the distinct sector.
Most of the problems in models of higher-order beliefs stem from
the fact that there are infinitely many levels of beliefs. However, ev-
idence from the laboratory indicates that people are not able to use
higher-order rationality,12 a requirement for coordination problems
due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, even in studies of level-k
reasoning, where players are framed and incentivized on using higher-
order beliefs, players still rarely use high levels of reasoning.13
Therefore, the third question, if there is is coordination failure due
to higher-order beliefs, or if high-cognition players use the first-best
strategy am despite the absence of common knowledge, arises natu-
rally:
Hypothesis 3 (Higher-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition sub-
jects who play the distinct sector in the Prediction Treatment and a black sec-
tor in the Cooperation Treatment, i.e., play “DD D B”.
Our design allows for another robustness check: There is an attain-
able strategy which is very similar to the one we use to identify first-
and higher-order beliefs: “DD B D”. This strategy will only be chosen
if players belief that their partner is of the low type, but still plays “D”
12Kneeland [2015] shows that only about 22% of all players use more than third-
order rationality.
13In Arad and Rubinstein’s [2012] 11-20 game, 80 % of the players only use 3rd-
order beliefs or lower despite the game being designed to facilitate higher-order rea-
soning.
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in the in the Coordination Treatment. This strategy can therefore not
be explained using our model.
Hypothesis (Robustness check). “DD B D” is played less often than “DD
B B” and “DD D B”.
3.5 Results
The experiment was conducted at the DR@W Laboratory at the Uni-
versity of Warwick using the experimental software "z-Tree" devel-
oped by Fischbacher [2007]. 130 subjects where recruited and received
payments between £3 and £18. Before showing the results, let us briefly
discuss the preliminaries of the experiment design.
The first preliminary is the focality of the distinct and the two black
sectors. From the choice data in Figure 3.6 we can see that more than
95% of all players have chosen one of these sectors in the Coordination
Treatment. Therefore, the black and distinct sectors seem to be focal
in our game. The second preliminary is that there are enough high-
cognition players, so that playing the high-cognition exclusive action
is a payoff-dominant equilibrium for the players. In Figure 3.7 we
can see that 58% of all players have chosen the distinct sector and are
therefore considered high-cognition players. Therefore, playing the
distinct sector would maximize the expected utility of high-cognition
players in a game where the type distribution is common knowledge
among high types independently of the degree of risk aversion (see
Section 3.B). We can also see that the second most frequently observed
behavior is choosing a black sector twice, whereas choosing a white
sector twice (which includes choosing the distinct white sector once
and another white sector once) and picking one black and one white
sector (labeled “Other“) was very rare.
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Figure 3.6: Results of the Coordination Treatment
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Figure 3.7: Results of the Self Treatment
These results are in line with Blume and Gneezy’s [2010] results
where around 52% (58% in our experiment) have been able to identify
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the distinct sector and around 23% (34%) have chosen the black sector.
We contribute the significantly lower level of noise (8% vs 25%) to the
extensive instructions and the quiz we conducted before the experi-
ment.14
Due to the lower level of noise we are, unlike Blume and Gneezy
[2010], able to use a within-subject design, in which each player has ac-
cess to 625 possible strategies.15 Of these strategies we consider 96.32%
as “noise”.16 As the number of strategies which support our hypoth-
esis are very low (1, 4 and 2 out of 625), the probability that someone
chooses them by mistake is very low. For a detailed overview of all
possible strategies and how we categorize them see Table 3.1.
Description Hypothesis # of strategies Proportion
DD D D 1: Coordination is possible 1 0.16%
DD B B 2: First-order beliefs matter 4 0.64%
DD D B 3: Higher-order beliefs matter 2 0.32%
BB B B (Low-cognition players) 16 2.56%
“Noise“ - 602 96.32%
WW W W (part of ”Noise“) 80 12.80%
Table 3.1: Overview of the strategies
Given the preliminaries, we can test hypotheses 1 through 3.
Hypothesis 1 (Coordination is possible). High-cognition players choose
in the coordination treatment D more often than any other choice.
The choice data from our experiment confirms this hypothesis. In
Figure 3.8 we can see that 80% have chosen the strategy ”DD D D“.
As this strategy represents only 0.16% of all available strategies (or 4%
when excluding the Self Treatment), we can reject the null hypothesis
14For the instructions and an overview of the quiz see the Online Appendix.
15We are here ignoring the order in which treatments are played.
16This noise includes not only players not understanding the experiment or be-
having randomly but also “Eureka”-learning (which was a big problem in Blume
and Gneezy [2010], see Section 3.C), making a mistake (e.g., picking a not distinct
white sector instead of the distinct sector, a mistake, which both of the authors made
multiple times while testing the experiment) and beliefs of low-cognition players.
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of this high level of coordination being a result of random play (p <
0.00001).
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Figure 3.8: Results of the Coordination Treatment (high-cognition
players)
Blume and Gneezy [2010] claim that ”beliefs matter“ and we test in
Hypothesis 2 if there are subjects whose pessimistic beliefs about the
other players’ skills lead to coordination failure.
Hypothesis 2 (First-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition sub-
jects who choose a black sector in the Prediction Treatment and Cooperation
Treatment, i.e., play “DD B B”.
Our data confirms this hypothesis. Figure 3.9 shows us the results
of all players, Figure 3.10 of the high-cognition players. In these fig-
ures we can see that about 9% of the high-cognition players (or 5% of
all players) have a first-order belief problem, leading to coordination
failure. As the fraction of strategies leading to this conclusion is very
small (0.64%) we can reject the null hypothesis that this result is due
to chance (p < 0.00001).
But do players really use higher-order beliefs in this type of games?
Hypothesis 3 tests for this question.
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Figure 3.9: Used strategies
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Figure 3.10: Used strategies (high-cognition players)
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Hypothesis 3 (Higher-order beliefs matter). There are high-cognition sub-
jects who play the distinct sector in the Prediction Treatment and a black sec-
tor in the Cooperation Treatment, i.e., play “DD D B”.
From Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 we can see that there are high-
cognition players who think that their partner is with a high probabil-
ity of the high type, they, however, still think there are coordination
problems. Again, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level
(p < 0.00001).
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Figure 3.11: Robustness check
Hypothesis (Robustness check). “DD B D” is played less often than “DD
B B” and “DD D B”.
All these results are statistically significant at the 1% level, how-
ever, our design allows for another robustness check: There is a strat-
egy which should not be played by rational players: “DD B D“, which
is about as likely to be picked at random as ”DD B B“ and ”DD D B“
but can not be explained by our model. Figure 3.11 shows us that only
2 subjects have chosen this strategy.
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We expected to have significant order effects, as in Blume and Gneezy
[2010]. However, it turns out, that the only robust order effect is a weak
effect in the Self Treatment (i.e., more subjects have been able to choose
the distinct sector twice later in the experiment).17 We attribute this to
a small change in design. We have explained every treatment before
the experiment started and we have conducted a quiz (Section 3.E.2),
testing if the instructions have been understood. This probably lead to
”Eureka learning“ before instead of during the experiment.
3.6 The role of beliefs in the fight against fe-
male genital mutilation
More important applications than the search for ones husband or wife
in a department store are suggested by recent studies in sociology and
development studies, for example by Bicchieri [2005].18 She claims
that common knowledge plays a significant role in the fight against fe-
male genital mutilation (FGM).19 FGM is practiced in, predominately
African, communities and is required in many of these communities
to find a husband and to prevent social exclusion. Despite being very
dangerous and unnecessary, it has a long standing tradition and is, in
areas where it is still practiced, very common. It is estimated to effect
up to 200 million women in 2016 (UNICEF [2016]). In game theoretic
terms the problem is one of equilibrium selection: There is one equi-
librium in which everyone accepts and uses FGM and one in which
no one does. The latter equilibrium is, given enough knowledge about
the subject, clearly better for everyone, but we still observe the former
equilibrium in many communities.
How is that problem related to higher-order beliefs? This game
might be modeled as a coordination game without common knowl-
17For the full analysis of order effects see Section 3.C.
18More examples in which common knowledge plays an important role can be
found in Chwe [2013].
19Most studies, however, don’t use the terms “beliefs” or “common knowledge”
but describe this concepts in their own words, frequently restricting their attention
to first-order and therefore ignoring higher-order beliefs.
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edge about the payoffs. While, from our point of view, the no-FGM
equilibrium is clearly better, there are societies who disagree and belief
in the (perceived) benefits while ignoring the risk. Using this model,
the game is very similar to the game we played in our experiment:20
The high type knows the real payoffs (i.e., that the non-FGM equilib-
rium is better than the FGM equilibrium), whereas the low type thinks
that the opposite is true. An important tool in the fight against FGM
is to inform people about the dangers and (lack of) benefits of it. The
equivalent in this model would be to chance the type of these families
from low to high. However, from our experiment we know, that just
changing the type might not be sufficient, as some people have beliefs
that still lead to coordination failure. Here we can see that differentiat-
ing between first-order beliefs and higher-order beliefs matters. While
taking care of first-order beliefs can be easily done by explaining, in
addition to the risks and lack of benefits of FGM, that other families
have also been (or will be) educated on this matter and that most fam-
ilies agree with these results, higher-order beliefs are not as simple. To
prevent coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs everyone has
to be gathered and the education has to be done in very large groups,
which is significantly more difficult and expensive.
But how important is this issue really, considering that the model
is very simplistic (we are, e.g., ignoring all dynamic issues) and that
generalizing from a lab experiment, conducted with university stu-
dents in Europe, to rural areas in Africa requires much more research
and data from (field) experiments. Studies like Bicchieri [2005] suggest
that higher-order beliefs might play a role; She claims that common
knowledge of this education plays an important role because negative
beliefs about the opinion of the other members of a community might
prevent a coordination on the better equilibrium (i.e., the one without
FGM): Even if I am convinced that this practice should be abolished, I
might still partake in it, to prevent my daughters from being excluded
from the community, as the others might not be convinced (i.e., my
20The absence of common knowledge here is, however, over the payoffs, not the
available actions.
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first-order belief is that others have not been educated). I also might
think that others will continue this practice because they think I wasn’t
educated (i.e., because of my second-order belief) and so on.
That means, that just educating a family (or, in game theoretic terms:
changing their type) does not necessarily lead them to change their
stance on FGM. But is there any evidence that families use beliefs?
Mackie [1996] and Mackie and LeJeune [2009] have compared the old
Chinese tradition of foot binding21 and FGM and pointed out that both
are similar: Both are required to find a husband, while being very
painful and dangerous without having any known benefits. Further-
more, they have a long-standing tradition (both can be traced back
more than 1000 years) and were widely spread in their respective cul-
tures. However, around 1910, foot binding has dropped in certain
parts of China from 99% to under 1% prevalence over the course of
just 20 to 30 years, without any change in policy (Gamble [1943], Keck
and Sikkink [1998]), whereas even a combined effort of the UN, sev-
eral NGOs and governments over the last 40 years resulted only in a
moderate decline from about 51% to 37% of women effected by FGM
in certain countries (UNICEF [2016]). Mackie [1996] claims that the
main difference is the method of information transmission: In China,
societies have been founded in which members publicly pledged to
not bind their daughters’ feet and to prevent their sons from mar-
rying women with bound feet, whereas the effort to prevent FGM
was mainly focused on changing the laws and educating the people
about the dangers and problems. The societies fighting foot bind-
ing made the education and position of the families common knowl-
edge whereas most organizations fighting FGM focused on changing
the opinion of the families without changing the higher-order beliefs
much.
But also between projects fighting FGM there have been differ-
ences. Tostan, a Senegal-based NGO, has, according to World Bank
Group [2012] successfully reduced the number of FGM in some parts
21Foot binding was a Chinese practice of bending and binding the four lower toes
of young girls tightly under the foot.
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of Senegal significantly. So, why did Tostan succeed where others have
failed? They claim that not only education but ” [...] public declara-
tions are critical in the process for total abandonment [of female geni-
tal cutting.] “ (Tostan [2016]) and are supported by World Bank Group
[2012] who emphasizes that education together with public discussion
and public declaration was an important factor in Tostan’s success.
These examples suggest that beliefs might play an important role,
as the more successful campaigns against foot binding and FGM also
addressed higher-order beliefs by introducing common knowledge whereas
others who focused on pure education have been less successful. How-
ever, it is not clear that common knowledge is required to achieve co-
ordination. It might be sufficient to explain that others have also been
educated (i.e., to take care of the first-order beliefs), which would be
much cheaper than providing common knowledge.
However, from our results we know that ignoring the higher-order
beliefs can have severe negative consequences. Our results can explain
why education without considering problems due to higher-order be-
liefs can have some effect but they can also explain why NGOs like
Tostan have significantly more success. Furthermore, these results
give reason to belief that only explaining if others have been educated
and are against FGM (i.e., changing the first-order beliefs) might not
be sufficient and making this education common knowledge might be
necessary to achieve all possible benefits from it.
However, the results from this experiment conducted with students
at a European university should of course not be generalized to ex-
plain behavior in small rural communities without further research
but gives us reason to belief that higher-order beliefs do matter.
3.7 Conclusion
We have seen that, in this game, absence of common knowledge was
not enough to prevent subjects to choose the Pareto-dominant equi-
librium strategy, as 76% of the high-cognition players have done so.
However, we still have a fraction of players who have beliefs that lead
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to coordination failure (around 18%) and of these only half could be
attributed to first-order beliefs.
Of the models of higher-order beliefs discussed in Section 3.4.2
and Section 3.B, only ”assuming common knowledge“22 or a com-
mon p-belief among high-cognition players about the type distribu-
tion were able to explain coordination on the payoff-dominant equilib-
rium. However, these assumptions can not explain any coordination
failure due to beliefs, as the beliefs are fixed by the model, whereas
the models which can explain this type of coordination failure predict
playing the payoff-dominated strategy.
Therefore, as we have observed a coordination rate of about 76%,
assuming common knowledge (or a common p-belief among high-
cognition players) might be the best tractable approximation available
in coordination games without common knowledge, depending on the
focus of the research.
Our work opens up some questions for future research: Can these
results be generalized to other populations and environments? Are
there certain parts of the populations who are more likely to exhibit
first- or higher-order beliefs which lead to coordination failure? Are
there other, maybe easier methods to make something common knowl-
edge? Furthermore, it might be worthwhile to check more general
structures of higher-order beliefs or if non-equilibrium models like
Strzalecki [2014] or Kneeland [2016] can explain this phenomenon bet-
ter.
22Meaning that one assumes that high-cognition players have common knowledge
about the type distribution among themselves.
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Appendix 3.A Belief hierarchies
Let B0i := Tj and B
k
i = Tj × ∆(Bk−1i ) with ∆ (B) being the space of
probability measures on B and ∆(X) being the space of probability
measures on the Borel field of X, endowed with the weak topology.
Using this notation, we can define a belief hierarchy as follows.
Definition 3 (Belief hierarchy). A k-th order belief is defined as
bki ∈ ∆(Bki )
with B0i = Tj and B
k
j = Tj × ∆(Bk−1j )
Furthermore, let us set b0i := ti.
A belief hierarchy of a player i is then b = {b0i , b1i , . . . .}
We therefore have a first order belief b1i ∈ ∆({low, high}) = [0, 1]
and higher-order beliefs bki ∈ [0, 1]k.
Furthermore, we assume these beliefs to be coherent, i.e. that be-
liefs of different orders do not contradict one another,23 and that a
low-cognition type does not know about higher cognitive types, i.e.,
bki = 0⇒ bk+1i = 0 ∀k ≥ 0.
This excludes, on the one hand, that a low-cognition player thinks
that the other player is a high-cognition player and, on the other hand,
that a player has a first-order belief that the other player is of a the high
type and a higher-order belief that the player is of the low type.
Appendix 3.B Equilibrium selection and mod-
els of higher-order beliefs
In this section we are going to discuss how different models of beliefs
and frequently used assumptions on the structure of higher-order be-
liefs influence the specific game we analyze.
Using the results from the literature on focal points in coordination
games (as discussed in Section 3.1.1), we know that we can restrict
23I.e., higher-order beliefs of a player mapped onto the space of beliefs of a lower
order are the same.
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our attention on the two actions with the highest payoffs am−1 and am.
This simplifies the game to a Bayesian game with two types, a low type
whose only attainable action is am−1 and a high type, who has access to
am−1 and am, without common knowledge about the type distribution.
Then, we can denote, with a small abuse of notation, the strategy of a
player as the action she chooses if she is of the high-type, i.e., am or
am−1, knowing that she will play am−1 if she is of the low type.
Let us first start with the most common assumption, that the distri-
bution of types is common knowledge. Then the expected utility of a (risk
neutral) high-cognition player is as depicted in Table 3.2, given her and
her partners strategies.24 p denotes here the probability of a player be-
ing of the high type. We can see that the prediction of the model then
depends on p. If the probability of a player being of the high type p
is too low (p < xm−1xm−1+xm ), only (am−1, am−1) will be an equilibrium. In
this paper we are going to assume that p ≥ xm−1xm−1+xm which makes sure
that the “better” equilibrium always exists.25 For risk-averse players,
it is required that p ≥ u(xm−1)u(xm−1)+u(xm) , so we know that as long as p ≥
1
2
the high-type equilibrium always exists, independently of the degree
of risk aversion. Furthermore, if the equilibrium exists, it is payoff
dominant.
am−1 am
am−1 xm−1, xm−1 (1− p)xm−1, 0
am 0, (1− p)xm−1 pxm, pxm
Table 3.2: Expected utilities of two high-cognition players
Therefore, the prediction of assuming that the distribution of types is
common knowledge is that, for a high-enough p, we should expect full
cooperation.
Monderer and Samet’s [1989] common p-belief is a generalization of
the concept of common knowledge and generates, in this model, the
24In the analysis we restrict our attention to risk-neutral players. However, the
analysis for the case of risk-averse players is analogous and the experimental results
are valid for every possible degree of risk aversion.
25In the experiment this assumption requires p > 13 . As the fraction of high-
cognition players is 58%, this assumption is not problematic.
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same predictions as assuming that the distribution of types is common
knowledge, given a high-enough p.
The game we are analyzing is very close to the original description
of a global game as introduced by Carlsson and Van Damme [1993].
Written down as in Table 3.2 it is a very similar game as the main ex-
ample used in Carlsson and Van Damme [1993]. Therefore, we know
that, given xm−1xm ≤ p ≤
2xm−1
xm+xm−1 (i.e., (am, am) is still a Nash equilibrium
but (am−1, am−1) is risk dominant), (am−1, am−1) will be the only ratio-
nalizable solution to the global game. Furthermore, Hellwig [2002]
shows that higher-order uncertainty about preferences leads to results
similar to Carlsson and Van Damme’s [1993] higher-order uncertainty
about payoffs, i.e., coordination on the "less risky" equilibrium.
Rubinstein [1989] shows that truncating common knowledge at any
finite level is equivalent to the situation without any common knowl-
edge at all and therefore suggests that players choose the save strategy
am−1.
Weinstein and Yildiz [2007a] establish a condition, called “global
stability under uncertainty” which implies that the change in equi-
librium actions is small in the change of kth-order beliefs and higher.
Therefore, under this condition, equilibria can be approximated by the
equilibrium with lower-order beliefs. Unfortunately, pure coordina-
tion games do, in general, not fulfill the conditions for “global stability
under uncertainty” as the best responses are very sensitive to every
order of beliefs and even a small change in some higher-order belief
might make a player change from am to am−1.
Appendix 3.C Order effects
Earlier, we have briefly discussed an uncertainty principle, in which
higher-order beliefs can not be measured without inducing them. This
theory is a related to the “good subjects hypothesis“ (Orne [1962]) ac-
cording to which some subjects try to figure out the research question
and then change their behavior to confirm said hypothesis. However,
in this case the difference is more subtle: As soon as they realize that
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Model Coordination First-order
belief coordina-
tion problems
Higher-order
belief coordina-
tion problems
Common
knowledge
Full coordina-
tion
No No
Common
p-belief
Full coordina-
tion
No No
Global games No coordination Yes Yes
Almost com-
mon knowl-
edge
No coordination No Yes.
Table 3.3: Models of higher-order beliefs
there is a higher-order belief problem, they might overestimate it.
Blume and Gneezy [2010] have encountered a different case of this
uncertainty hypothesis. ”Having a player play against himself may
trigger an insight that switches a player from low to high cognition
("Eureka!" learning). There may be an uncertainly principle at work
here in that we cannot measure a player’s cognition without altering
it.“ (Blume and Gneezy [2010]) This suggests, that the order of treat-
ments might be important. Therefore, we implemented a random or-
der. However, it turns out that we have (almost) no order effect, as can
be seen in Table 3.4. The only statistically significant effect is that, if the
self treatment was the first treatment, there was a significantly higher
number of ”Other“ results than when it was the second (p = 0.0062)
or third treatment (p = 0.0139). Furthermore, the distinct sector was
played more often in the coordination treatment if it was the second
than the first treatment (p = 0.0277), however, there were no signif-
icant effects when comparing the first and third and the second and
third.26 The former has a intuitive explanation (i.e., practicing the task
makes it less likely to make a mistake) whereas the later is considered
to be a type II error by the authors.
The question now is, why did Blume and Gneezy [2010] encounter
strong "Eureka!"-learning effects whereas we had (almost) no signif-
26Using the one-tailed Fisher’s exact test.
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Treatment Self Prediction Coordination
Order DD BB Other D B W D B W
1st 18 10 8 23 15 3 22 22 3
2nd 32 24 2 20 16 2 24 10 0
3rd 25 10 1 32 15 4 23 15 5
Table 3.4: Order effects of the different treatments
icant effect. The authors attribute this to the fact that we used more
extensive instructions and a quiz to make sure the instructions where
understood. More importantly, the participants were instructed in all
three treatments before they played the first game which most likely
triggered the learning before the first decision, whereas in Blume and
Gneezy [2010] the instructions for the second treatment were distributed
after completion of the first treatment.
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Appendix 3.D Data
For the complete data set please refer to the Online Appendix.
Self Guessing Coordination
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
Self Guessing Coordination
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D D
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D D B
D D B D
D D B D
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D B B
D D W D
D D W W
D B D D
B B D D
B B D D
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B D B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
Self Guessing Coordination
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B B
B B B W
B B B W
B B W D
B B W B
B W D D
B W B B
W B W D
W W D D
W W D D
W W B D
W W W B
W W W W
W W W W
W W W W
Table 3.5: Strategic choice data
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Appendix 3.E Online Appendix
3.E.1 Instructions
Welcome to this experiment in economic decision making. It will take
approximately 60 minutes. First of all, please check that the number
on the card handed to you matches the number on the cubicle that you
are seated in and that your mobile phones are turned off.
Before we start, we will explain the rules of this experiment. You
will also find these rules on the paper provided, so you can read along
and check again during the experiment. If you have any questions,
please do not speak up but raise your hand and we will come to you
and answer your question privately.
From now on, please do not talk, and listen carefully. In this ex-
periment you will earn a minimum of £3, and potentially up to £18.
How much money you earn will depend on your decisions and those
of the other participants. Your reward will be paid out at the end of
the experiment. None of the other participants will know how much
money you made.
In this experiment you will be asked to make decisions related to
a disc that has 5 sectors, similar to the disc provided to you. The disc
has two identical sides. Your goal will be to pick the same sector twice
(more on that later). During this experiment the disc will be flipped
and/or rotated randomly.
Pictures on page 2 illustrate rotation and flipping. Since you will
not be told if the disc was flipped and/or rotated, it might even be
the case that disc looks exactly the same though sectors have changed
their positions.
The arrow tracks one specific sector that changes its position as the
disc is rotated and/or flipped.
This is an example of rotating the disc by two sectors:
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This is an example of flipping the disc:
In the experiment the disc will be surrounded by the letters A, B, C, D,
and E. These labels are not part of the disc! They are only included to
allow you to choose a sector.
In the experiment you will make decisions in the following envi-
ronments (the order will be chosen randomly):
(Self Game) You will be asked to pick a sector twice; first you
choose a sector; then the disc might be flipped and/or rotated. After
this you are shown the same disc and have to choose a sector again.
You will not observe the flipping/rotation of the disc. If you manage
to guess the same sector twice, your payoff will be £5. Otherwise, you
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will receive 0. Therefore, to earn more money you want to maximise
your chances to pick the same sector twice.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Self Game, using a
simpler disc with only 2 instead of 5 sectors:
First you picked the black sector; then you picked the black sector
again. Therefore, you pick the same sector twice and earn £5.
(Prediction Game) You are matched randomly with another per-
son and you have to guess the choice of this person, while she plays the
Self Game. First, you choose a sector on the disc; each time the other
person picks the sector you chose, you will receive £2.5. As the other
player picks twice in the Self Game, you can earn £0, £2.5 or £5 in this
situation, depending on your and the other person’s choice. There-
fore, to earn more money you want to guess what the other player is
playing in the Self Game described above.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Prediction Game,
again with the simpler disc:
First you picked the black sector. The other player then plays the
Self Game. He first picks the black sector and therefore you earn £2.5.
Then he picks the white sector and therefore you earn £0. Thus you
earn £2.5 in total.
(Coordination Game) You are matched randomly with another per-
son and both of you are asked to pick a sector on the disc simultane-
ously. Both of you know that you play the Coordination Game. You
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both see the same disc but possibly differently flipped and rotated. If
both of you pick the same sector, then your payoff will be £5. Other-
wise, you will receive £0. Therefore, to earn more money you want to
guess the sector your partner is picking here, while he is trying to do
the same.
Here is an example of the choices made in a Coordination Game,
again with the simpler disc.
You picked the black sector. The other player picked the white sector.
You therefore failed to coordinate and both of you earn £5 each.
The experiment consists of two periods. Each period consists of the
three games as described above, using a 5-sector disc; the order of the
games is random. At the end of the experiment one of the two periods
will be randomly chosen. The earnings made in this period will be
paid out in cash.
Again, please do not talk during this experiment! If you have ques-
tions just raise your hand.
Before the experiment there will be a quiz to check your under-
standing. Read hints carefully if you get stuck during the quiz.
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3.E.2 Quiz
In this appendix you can find screenshots of the quiz which was con-
ducted before the experiment. Participants who made a mistake in
some part of the quiz were given a small hint and then were asked to
repeat this part of the quiz.
Figure 3.12: Quiz part 1
Figure 3.13: Quiz part 2
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Figure 3.14: Quiz part 3
Figure 3.15: Quiz part 4
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Figure 3.16: Quiz part 5
Figure 3.17: Quiz part 6
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Figure 3.18: Quiz part 7
Figure 3.19: Quiz part 8
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